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Special Community summit stays temperate on German issue



The necessary measures, said Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the European Community's special summit meeting in Paris, would need to be based on sound judgement and a sense of proportion.

He was referring to the GDR and to the comprehensive aid measures on which Bonn and the Community might embark should the process of democratisation lead to free elections in East Germany.

The Twelve showed a sense of proportion in accepting the invitation of President Mitterrand, current chairman of the European Council, to discuss latest developments in Eastern Europe at a working dinner in the Elysée Palace.

They dispensed with visions of political structures in a Europe that cannot remain unaffected by changes in the East and restricted themselves to specifics.

That was all the more advisable as the forthcoming superpower summit off Malta in the Mediterranean is said by those concerned not to intend considering changes in the political map of Europe.

The European Community, page 4

A corresponding keynote was sounded during the visits to Budapest and Warsaw made by French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and European Commission president Jacques Delors just before the Paris summit.

They were confronted with the immediate economic problems faced by the two countries most advanced in the process of political reform much more than with speculation on a possible application for full or associate membership of the European Community.

The message was clear. Both countries faced a harsh winter. The time factor was of great importance, Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki told his Western European visitors. The next few weeks might be crucial.

Both Hungary and Poland are negotiating terms with the International Monetary Fund. The success of these talks will depend not on urging by the Twelve in Paris but on convincing programmes of economic reform presented to the IMF.

The catalogue of specific measures discussed in Paris was lengthy. Coordination of Western aid to Poland and Hungary by the European Commission will be further discussed at a 13 December Ministerial conference attended by 24 countries and including Polish and Hungarian representatives.

The European Community itself has pledged direct assistance totalling 300 million ECUs, or over DM600m.

The European Investment Bank is in a position to finance projects totalling one billion ECUs, bankrolled over a three-year period by European Community budget funds.

Trade on easier terms, as agreed in treaties with Poland and Hungary, has already been brought forward, as it were, and both countries enjoy tariff preferences granted to developing countries.

European Community food aid to Poland is to be stepped up yet again. Training programmes and environmental protection projects have been agreed too.

Ideas such as proposals to set up a Development and Modernisation Bank for Eastern Europe or a Foundation for Vocational and Management Training are being considered.

The GDR is less needy than other East European countries, but talks on a treaty that will probably cover more than mere trade ties are also imminent.

Its scope will depend, as will the development of intra-German trade ties, on progress in democratisation.

The Paris summit demonstrated sound judgement in yet another sector. Despite the evident connection the Twelve set aside for the time being their dispute over the pace at which, given revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, integration within the European Community, including crucial issues in respect of monetary union and the social dimension of the internal market, was to proceed.

This dispute will hold pride of place at the Strasbourg European Community summit on 8-9 December, a gathering that will practically conclude France's six-month presidency. Credit is due to Chancellor Kohl for having made it clear at the Paris summit that the Federal Republic is clearly committed to the Western system of values and for having emphasised the importance of European integration.

Eberhard Wisdorff

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 20 November 1989)



Summiteers in Paris. Left, French President Mitterrand, centre Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez and, right, Bonn Chancellor Kohl. (Photo: dpa)

Kohl's visit signals step forward in Bonn-Warsaw relations

At a reception in Warsaw attended by the German Federal Chancellor, Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki said Poland had gained a friend; he hoped Helmut Kohl would continue to champion Poland's cause.

This comment accurately described the outcome of the visit. Both sides had made sound progress even though they hadn't, by any stretch of the imagination, solved all their problems.

That could hardly have been otherwise, given that it was the first visit to Poland by a German Federal Chancellor for 12 years. Besides, Bonn and Warsaw had set about the visit with different expectations and objectives.

The link between the Chancellor's visit to Poland and dramatic developments in the GDR, including Dr Kohl's interruption of his visit to fly back to Berlin and Bonn, certainly made it clear how important cordial relations between Bonn and Warsaw are for further progress in the all-European integration process. Not for nothing did the joint declaration stress the *special responsibility of Poland* and the Federal Republic for a policy of peace, understanding and cooperation in Europe.

Premier Mazowiecki showed understanding for the interruption of the visit as planned; he was well aware of the significance of the reform process in the GDR. A similar process had begun in his own country nine months previously.

The Chancellor's visit and the momentum of intra-German developments have prompted a strategic reappraisal in Poland.

In the long term the two German states are expected to join forces, but subject to a number of important prerequisites: the consent of the Allies, a positive declaration of popular intent in both German states and some form of "all-European" approval of reunification.

What is more, Warsaw says, the process must proceed in a controlled manner.

To some extent the problem of Poland's western borders seems to be expected to be settled once and for all, as Warsaw would like to see it settled, more easily with a democratic united Germany.

Fears have also been voiced that the GDR might be given preference over Poland where economic and financial assistance are concerned.

As the joint declaration showed, both sides naturally made compromises.


No mention was made of the Polish government calling on the Church to hold Holy Mass in German. This provision was deleted under pressure from the Polish episcopate.

No mention was made of a German minority either, merely of people and popu-

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The next edition of THE GERMAN TRIBUNE will appear on 10 December.

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INTERNATIONAL

Changes in East demand new Western strategies

Once the intoxication of meeting again has subsided, the Germans will appreciate that opening the Berlin Wall and the intra-German border has wrought far-reaching changes in both German states and in European and world affairs.

This event without parallel in history presents Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik and its entire foreign policy with new, tough tasks that require responsible decisions.

Bonn must integrate the tempestuous headway in intra-German affairs in the all-European process and ensure the further progress of East-West relations.

The very next deadlines will be almost entirely overshadowed by these tasks. They include the meeting of the WEU Council of Minister, the US-Soviet Mediterranean summit and the Strasbourg European Community summit early next month.

Then come Nato's autumn conferences, Foreign Minister Genscher's mid-month visit to Hungary and the 19 December joint European Community and Efta summit meeting.

They may yet be joined by further deadlines, such as the conference of 24 Western countries, as proposed by Herr Genscher, that are prepared to jointly help the Polish and Hungarian economies back on to their feet.

Since the Berlin Wall has, to all intents *and purposes, been demolished previous* analyses of the situation and contingency planning have been of no further use.

No-one has alternative concepts at the ready. They have yet to be drawn up, which excuses part of what has been said in the past few days.

Yet politicians could still have shown a little more perspective and adopted a more level-headed and specific approach than the fine words and all-inclusive offers (with strings) they chose to make, not to mention tasteless party-political bickering.

It simply isn't true to say that all fundamental decisions must now be taken by the GDR leaders alone.

Their next moves must, indeed, pave the way for free elections and, arguably even more urgently, for a gradual economic opening of the GDR.

But economic moves in particular must be undertaken on a cooperative basis.

In addition to intensifying existing facilities and setting up new working parties (on transport, telecommunications, foreign exchange regulations and political coordination), setting up a joint economic council would seem advisable.

With European Community participation it might both supervise the development of intra-German economic ties and emerge as a focal point of European economic policy.

Future cooperation between the two German states in the economic sector will have a much more far-reaching role than their immediate ramifications.

Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher have made it clear, in contacts with Bonn's allies and with the Soviet leaders, that the Federal Republic has no intention of departing from an existing policy line that has been largely responsible for major changes in Europe.

That is why Nato, the European Community, the CSCE process and disarmament talks remain the foundations of German policy. There can be no question of Bonn going it alone or pursuing a separate and distinctive policy of its own.

But Nato will urgently need to reconsider its defence and disarmament concepts.

It, like the Warsaw Pact, will need to switch from being a mainly military alignment to a mainly political role aimed at cooperative developments.

Once the central source of tension in Europe no longer applies, US citizens will soon no longer be alone in wondering whether stationing troops in central Europe can still be justified in existing numbers.

Issues such as modernisation of Nato's Lance missiles, which all but brought about a split in the North Atlantic pact last spring, will then no longer pose problems.

Disarmament talks are now subject to extra pressure to achieve results, partly because East and West even more urgently need substantial funds for other purposes.

The crucial issue and the greatest threat to stability will from now on be posed by the task of economic consolidation in Eastern Europe and narrowing the prosperity gap.

A uniform Western policy toward Eastern Europe, especially a uniform policy to be pursued by Western Europe, is even more urgently needed.

So is a perspective for Europe as a whole as an economic region. This, indeed, is a matter of life and death for the reform movements in the East.

The Budapest conference of Hungarian, Italian, Austrian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers on a start to regional cooperation is an important contribution and step in the right direction.

But, with a view to 1993 and the single European market, coordination of all European processes is essential, of all-European developments, including closer ties with the Efta states and developing

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Reactions from the four powers

WASHINGTON

US Presidents from John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan have stood in front of the Berlin Wall and called for its demolition.

Now the possibility of reunification no longer appears totally unrealistic, Washington too is fairly alarmed about what might be unpredictable consequences.

The Americans are not yet entirely clear what they ought to want. The only point on which the US government is clear is that there must not, for the foreseeable future, be a neutral, demilitarised Germany.

There might, say, be two more or less loosely associated German states in which, again for the foreseeable future, Nato and Warsaw Pact troops continue to be stationed.

But it is too soon to start thinking along these lines. That is why President Bush feels the time is not yet ripe for symbolic gestures such as a visit to Berlin.

The *New York Times* says Washington and Bonn are agreed and that the Americans continue to approve of reunification.

Bonn is said to have agreed not to embark on any immediate moves in the direction of reunification until the outlines of an all-European security system have been drafted. Many US commentators, in contrast, see reunification as just around the corner. William Safire wrote in the *New York Times* that the GDR had to all intents and purposes already ceased to exist; what remained to be done was a mere formality.

The world would then sit up and take notice. "Germany, tired of excuses,... will become a nuclear power with space weapons that make it a 'paramount power' before the end of the millennium."

PARIS

Germans dancing on the Berlin Wall have made the French dizzy too, but politicians and commentators have growing fears of a united Germany.

Commitments to German unity sound progressively feebler. "The arrival of the East Germans must not go hand in hand with the establishment of a state the weight of which is incompatible with our own institutions," says ex-President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

"The Germans may feel a development to be desirable, but (it must be) within the framework of the treaties by which they are bound to us."

France Soir has visions of German reunification being followed by an army of job-seeking Turks migrating to France, which has race problems of its own.

Some French newspapers have followed in the footsteps of TF1, Channel One of French TV, in publishing charts showing France as a demographic, economic and military dwarf alongside Greater Germany.

Enlarging the European Commission is seen as an "elegant solution" by Opposition leaders such as M. Giscard d'Estaing and ex-Premier Jacques Chirac, not to mention President Mitterrand and the French president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors.

The Community must anchor Bonn firmly in the West and extend a welcoming hand to the GDR.

But the French public have yet to share to any great extent the hectic alarm voiced by politicians.

Six out of 10 French people questioned feel German reunification would be good for France. A mere 19 per cent, mainly old-age pensioners, have doubts.

LONDON

The British government views the incipient debate on reunification with marked restraint.

Mrs Thatcher is reported to be increasingly alarmed lest events in the GDR jeopardise Mr Gorbachov's difficult position.

Her fears were voiced by William Waldegrave, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, on BBC TV when he warned against the GDR pulling out of the Warsaw Pact.

"Mr Gorbachov has made it quite clear," he said, "that there will be no withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact." *The Times* says Downing Street is in close contact with the Soviet embassy, with Mrs Thatcher favouring a wait-and-see attitude.

She is opposed to fresh Deutschlandpolitik initiatives. In her view reunification does not rate high on the agenda. She is more interested in seeing a multi-party democracy set up in the GDR.

"We must be careful," British newspapers quote her as saying. Any talk about reunification would inevitably give rise to questions about a realignment in Europe, including a GDR pullout from the Warsaw Pact.

Observers feel Mrs Thatcher *will* vigorously oppose, at the European Community summit meeting early next month, any resolutions to set up an economic and monetary union.

She will refer to developments in Eastern Europe as justifying her deep dislike of any idea of sterling joining the EMS.

MOSCOW

Nikolai Portugalov couldn't believe his ears when he tuned into *Deutsche Welle* on 10 November and heard that East Germans were flocking to the West.

Mr Gorbachov's German affairs expert readily admitted that he hadn't been expecting the border to be thrown open so soon.

Yet officially, at least, Moscow sounds a note of relative composure about the opening of the intra-German border.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze even termed it a "normal occurrence." Soviet experts on German affairs solved the German Question two years ago, as part of Moscow's "new thinking," within the framework of the "common European house."

Soviet historian Vyacheslav Dashichev called the Berlin Wall a "relic of the Cold War," while Mr Portugalov wrote in 1987 that:

"The further construction of the European house would open up opportunities Federal Germans ought to welcome." A few days after the de facto demolition of the Berlin Wall he now envisages a "special relationship between the two German states," while Mr Dashichev is convinced that the post-war order in Europe is on the brink of a fresh start.

The two German states in the heart of Europe were of crucial importance for a realignment in Europe. But German reunification is generally felt to be a remote prospect. The territorial order, in other words borders, is non-negotiable.

(Kieler Nachrichten, 14 November 1989)

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GERMANY

Coming West with an ambivalence of spirit

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The first and most tumultuous stage of the major German "reunion" on 11/12 November has made one thing clear: a large number of East Germans do not appear to be particularly keen on the idea of reunification.

Not only Opposition groups in the GDR have overwhelmingly expressed their aversion to reunification. The visitors who came to the West on the weekend also showed little interest in the topic.

Forty years of division and forty years of dual statehood have cast a long shadow. This comes as no surprise to those familiar with the GDR.

There is a pride in one's own achievements, a certain defiance of the big and more successful brother in the West, and a disapproval of the darker sides of the latter's existence: permissiveness, crime, drug problems and, last but not least, unemployment.

This always contrasted with the promise of freedom, free movement, the free development of one's personality, free informaton, the abundance of goods and mass prosperity. Those no longer able to endure the GDR brand of socialism followed this path.

This mixture of motives has always existed. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that so many East Germans are now taking advantage of the new freedom to travel to look round the temple of consumption and then return home.

They live in hope that things will improve, that the political prerequisites have been created, and that all they need to do is take to the streets if the process begins to flag.

This could turn out to be an illusion.

By allowing East Germans to travel freely the ruling SED has made a clever move. It has inspired hopes of a better future and at the same time robbed the reform movement of part of its momentum.

Furthermore, the regime now knows that it need not fear the demand for an elimination of dual statehood.

This is an important factor for the political course adopted by the new Krenz/Modrow leadership team.

The Opposition groups in the GDR must beware. The power-minded communist SED is not going to let itself be ousted from its traditional leading role that easily.

The SED still has the letter of the law on its side. Article 1 of the GDR constitution defines the character of the state ("socialist state of the workers and peasants") and lays down the leading role of the official party ("under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party").

It is not clear how the SED intends making this stipulation compatible with the free formation of a government.

If the constitution is to be viewed with greater respect than it has done so far — the proposal by Egon Krenz to set up a constitutional court points in this direction — any new policies must be preceded by a credible statement by the government that it intends, together with parliament, changing the constitution and ridding it of the relics of the Leninist past.

Nothing of the kind has happened yet or seems likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Instead, the new prime minister, Hans Modrow, keeps on talking about the intention of forming a "coalition government" and obviously also means after an election.

It is equally obvious which party is to assume leadership in such a constellation.

Up to now the SED has not officially commented on the demand by reformers that it should declare its willingness to respect the outcome of free elections and, if need be, also relinquish power.

The SED will already view a renunciation of its previous power monopoly and the participation of other political groups in power as a major concession to democracy.

This is the underlying intention of Modrow's coalition model. According to the SED, however, the "other" participants can be no more than junior partners.

No-one disputes the right of Germans in the GDR to decide against a single German state.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to go so far as to drop the option on such unity altogether, as repeatedly advocated by Opposition groups in the GDR.

In doing so they consolidate the SED's claim to leadership, weaken the pressure to reform and reduce the prospects of extensive economic and financial aid.

The Opposition groups must realise that only a single German state would be able to implement the tremendous reconstruction programme needed after forty years of Communist party mismanagement.

An expert from the German Institute of Economic Research in Berlin estimates the need for public investments in the environment, energy, transport and commu*nication sectors at at least DM300bn.*

It is impossible to imagine just how much more is needed to modernise industry and reconstruct the cities.

Provided further steps are taken towards reform the Federal Republic of Germany is willing to give the GDR economic assistance. Admittedly, in terms of the capital required this will be no more than a drop in the ocean. The money provided will continue to trickle away in the maladministration of the system.

If the Germans in the GDR want to alter their fate they need the patronage of a single German state which stands up for its interests and an economic system which give the country a future.

The "third path" envisaged by some Opposition groups has one thing in common with the previous socialist path: it will produce a poorhouse.

Unfortunately, there are plenty of examples of this throughout the world.

Fritz Ullrich Fack

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 15 November 1989)

Continued from page 1

lation groups who were of German or Polish extraction or were committed to the language, culture and traditions of the other community.

But the Polish government agreed to grant ethnic Germans, especially in Upper Silesia, rights they are entitled — a great step forward.

The Poles are bound to feel dissatisfied that no headway was made on compensation for Poles forced to work for the Germans during the war. The Chancellor should not have taken such a hard line here.

What matters for Warsaw, however, are the economic and financial commitments the Chancellor undertook in his letter to Premier Mazowiecki outlining details of the joint declaration.

They included resumption of Hermes export credit guarantees, the provision of balance-of-payments aid once Poland had come to terms with the IMF, partial remission of the 1975 loan and further financial assistance to modernise Polish agriculture, for instance.

In the long term these measures will not be enough, but they represent the essential step forward from words to deeds on which the Polish Premier was particularly keen.

Reinhold Vetter

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 17 November 1989)

The cold, hard facts are still there the morning after

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

After the jubiliation which followed the decision to open the inner-German borders the risk of disillusionment has increased.

Hardly had East German citizens ejected former leading figures such as Erich Honecker and Günther Mittag from office and returned home from the reunion celebrations in the West than they were confronted with the old day-to-day problems: queues in front of the shops, the lack of consumer goods and a currency which has no value.

The welcoming money East Germans receive in the West (DM100) is just enough for a weekend of bananas, ground coffee and a visit to the Beate Uhse sex shop in Berlin. It cannot, however, resolve supply problems.

They can only be improved if the washed-out economy of the GDR is reformed. But how?

The 16 million East Germans know roughly what they want in the political field: borders which are permanently open, the end of the SED's claim to leadership, free elections and a free press.

It is not so clear what it is to be done with the economy.

It is obvious that the end of state socialism is also nigh in the economic sector too. But will it be succeeded by a market economy modelled on the West German system (or even with West Ger*man predominance) or by a different* variant of socialism?

The extreme form of a planned economy, as practised in the GDR, has undoubtedly failed.

Bureaucracy and centralism have paralysed industry. Inflexible combines have been unable to even partly satisfy the needs of the population.

More responsibility must be delegated to grass roots level. Private initiative must be encouraged and not discouraged. Competition must shake up monopolies.

Even the most pigheaded party official has now realised this. Yet to believe that this insight is enough would be an illusion.

A little bit of market to make sure that the planned economy functions more smoothly — this is how some GDR economists picture a future economic policy.

Concepts such as market economy socialism or socialist market economy are being tossed to an fro; catchwords which mainly conceal the lack of true concepts. In the final analysis, an answer will have to be found to the following question: Is the GDR willing to take the Hungarian road to the West?

Is the GDR willing to categorically reject what it has propagated as a superior concept in the competition between the systems for forty years?

A political leadership under Egon Krenz hardly seems likely to make the decisions needed. Yet who knows how long Egon Krenz will be in charge.

Attempts to muddle through with half-hearted reforms are doomed.

Following the opening of the borders the GDR can no longer cut off its economy from the rest of the world.

Millions of East German Marks are already accumulating in West Berlin department stores. One possible result of the new policy is that visitors from the West will use this money to buy up everything they can find in the shops in Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden.

How can East Germans be prevented from trying to earn some West German Marks on the side if the hourly wage in the West amounts to a whole day's wage in the East?

The GDR must push through radical solutions: a monetary reform which aligns the huge stock of money in the GDR with the extremely poor range of goods on offer without depriving many East Germans of the money they have saved for forty years; a price reform which fills the shelves after a transitional period, but does not lead to a situation in which the artificially reduced rents and food prices increase drastically.

Well off in comparison with others in East Bloc

The fact that even Mikhail Gorbachov has announced all this in the Soviet Union but has been unable to implement it shows just how difficult the task is.

The GDR economy, however, could be brought onto a market economy course. It is not a hopeless case right from the outset.

In comparison with the West the country is not in good shape, but in comparison with the Soviet Union, Poland and even Hungary it is well-off.

Western, above all West German firms are waiting to set up joint ventures in Saxony or Thuringia as soon as possible. This is not a generous contribution towards development aid, but calculated business.

A GDR without the socialist bureaucracy has plenty to offer. The people are qualified, are willing to work harder and achieve more than they have done so far.

With western technology and western management goods could be produced at a high standard in the GDR — and, in the foreseeable future, at a low cost.

It is understandable that the idea of becoming an extended workbench of the Federal Republic of Germany does not trigger a storm of enthusiasm on the other side of the Wall.

As an independent concern, however, the GDR has been a failure.

Uwe Vorkötter

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 16 November 1989)

GERMANY

Fresh winds from the East are causing twitchings in corridors of Brussels

European matters are piling up, one on top of the other — the single European market, currency union, a social charter for workers, the opening up of the Community of 12 to the East.

Now the tricky question of reunification can be added. Other European countries are looking anxiously at the Federal Republic and its future in the Community.

The German Question has become a matter of paramount importance in the corridors of the EC headquarters.

This has less to do with the idea of a relaxation of the German commitment to the Community, which used to be the discussion point, than ideas of integrating the German Democratic Republic into the European concept.

In discussions in Brussels the old alternative, integration or reunification, no longer emerges.

German reunification reservations of 1957, when the Treaties of Rome were signed, no longer play a role in the astonishing phenomena of the past few days.

Jacques Delors is the man who has presented a new view of the old question. Since he became president of the European Commission in 1985 he has concerned himself with the Germans, their changing history, their limited interest in European unification until now, and their inclination to express satisfaction with the Federal Republic's economic weight in the world and to underestimate the Federal Republic's political contribution.

Three years ago, in an interview with the London *Financial Times*, he said; "We should at last take account of the new Germany." He added that the Federal Republic would not be motivated to take part in EC developments when there were continuous reminders of a guilt which is now 40 years old.

He pointed out that the Germans were a great people and that their economy was the strongest in Europe. "I am trying to convince them that Europe is their future," he said.

Since then this idea has been a constant theme in Jacques Delors' public statements. It goes along with statements made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher came on the scene when Poland and Hungary were feverish for reform and the first GDR refugees arrived in the Federal Republic.

In Vienna at the end of September he supported the view that the the European Community must keep itself open not only for Austria but also for Poland and Hungary.

This could only be achieved at the best if the 12 member-states in the Community disregarded the point about close cooperation in defence matters, included in the Single European Act.

Genscher's comments disturbed Delors. They seemed to indicate that the German Foreign Minister was speaking out for a pause in European developments, Genscher of all people, the man who at the beginning of the 1980s was responsible for putting steam into integration in conjunction with the then Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo.

Delors feared that Genscher, unintentionally, could stimulate the Germans to put the brakes on currency union and the social charter.

It seemed that the new impetus, which had been pushing the Community along for the past two years, was endangered.

A disturbed Delors went to Bonn at the beginning of October. In talks with Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher he tried to present his viewpoint.

He told the Chancellor and Foreign Minister that the Community could only open up towards the East and be ready to include new partners if the Community had gained internal stability.

He said that the Community would need to have stronger foundations if it were to be broadened one day.

In Delors' view the most important way of strengthening the Community was the realisation of economic and currency union, which he has advocated for years. He said that only in this way could the 12-member Community become a "stable but open model" for other countries.

It seems that no one in Bonn denyed this view, and since then Genscher has supported an acceleration of integration as he previously did.

Delors' ideas about Germany were made clear in a speech to the European College in Bruges.

He said that the Community could only help the reform-minded states in the East Bloc, and at the same time give a satisfactory answer to the German Question, if the Community admitted without reservations its adherence to *self-determination and let member-*states have room for manoeuvre for self-realisation through a strengthening of its federalist structures.

This meant that if the Germans were to decide for unity the Community must be prepared for this.

If objections were put in the Germans' path, their firm commitment to the Community could be undermined.

Like President Mitterrand, Delors knows that the first priority of the Germans is expressed in the preamble to Basic Law (Constitution). It states: The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany. There is controversy about how a reunified German could be integrated into the Community.

Delors, asked recently on French television if he could envisage the day when there would be an East German commissioner in Brussels, sponanteously replied: "Certainly. Why not?"

This certainly does not mean that he would give preference to an "Austrian solution" with two German partners. His prime criterion is the right to self-determination.

Sir Leon Brittan, the British vice-president of the EC, took an opposing view. In his view the EC should welcome a reunified Germany if no other member was admitted into it. Sir Leon said that the Community should take note that "a member had extended his territory."

Martin Bangemann, also a vice-president of the EC, voiced the same idea, more cautiously perhaps, after he returned from East Berlin. Senior Commission officials around Jacques Delors have begun to arrange systematically their ideas on the German Question. They have produced a three-stage plan.

In the first stage both German states are requested to take in hand their destiny within the context of self-determination and the preamble to Basic Law.

Neighbours in the East and the West would be consulted in the second stage. In the third the victorious powers of the Second World War must decide, because they have the powers of decision for Germany as a whole. The attitude of the Europeans would be the "clamp" between the first and second stages.

In Washington, where there has recently been interest in Delors' attitudes to the German Question, this view is widely supported.

But all these speculations show up that it is hardly possible to think about a reunified Germany in the EC without a sustained change in the balance of power, economically and politically, in Europe.

Like a dark shadow the ghost of a "Fourth Reich" appears before people's eyes and even wanders through the corridors of EC headquarters in Brussels.

Many have fears of opening up the Community to the East Bloc. Isn't the Community formed on the pattern of the French spirit? Would not the geopolitical centre of the Community move towards Germany if the gates were opened to the East and a reunified Germany was part of the Community?

There are many questions but few reliable answers. One thing is certain, however: the fresh breeze from the East has had its effect in Brussels. The Community must be looked at afresh.

Peter Hort

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 November 1989)

Disagreement on special status of East Berlin

Uncharacteristically, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was terse when asked in Brussels about the preparations for the proposed trade agreement with East Germany.

He said that there would be differing views among EC member-states on whether the time was appropriate to make a political signal to East Berlin.

In any event he wanted to avoid giving the impression that Bonn intended to apply pressure on its partners. He is reported to have himself suggested in the Council of Foreign Ministers that the EC should not rush things.

On the other hand EC Commissioner Martin Bangemann, former Economic Affairs Minister in Bonn, advised haste. He said he believed that an immediate and obvious EC presence in East Berlin was vital.

In his view this was important even through the full extent and the direction of the reform process could not yet be discerned.

Herr Bangemann, an FDP politician, could see no sense in prolonging negotiations. He said that the new leadership in the GDR wanted early dialogue with the EC.

But whether Brussels delays its mandate to negotiate or approves an agreement at the end of the month, fundamentally the EC has been open for negotations with the GDR for some time.

The Commission's discussions to sound out attitudes have revealed that there are basically no problems involved. A satisfactory formula was found at the beginning of 1987 for the inclusion of West Berlin.

Yet the room for manoeuvre for direct trade concessions is limited. Still, in the short-term, East Berlin can count on the gradual elimination of import quotas.

But custom duties and import quotas are not so much a headache for the East German economy as being cut off from the single European market when it comes into being. This can only be prevented by regular contacts and institutional links with the EC.

A suitable method here, for instance, could be the "mixed committee," set up in all Community trade agreements. In such a committee both sides could regularly bring up trade problems.

Equally necessary is a constant exchange of technical information, for instance involving norms and standards.

During his visit to East Berlin Herr Bangemann got the impression that the dangers, which differing developments could produce, were not fully understood in the GDR.

Technical norms could become ugly barriers in trade, if dialogue is not sought for with a trading partner and the necessary adjustments are not made.

In the long-term the total GDR trade with partners abroad would be impaired, if the authorities responsible did not demonstrate flexibility and good will.

Sales in Western Europe presuppose a knowledge of the markets. This is only possible through close cooperation between companies, irrespective of what the GDR leadership thinks in future about private ownership.

Here again, agreements with the EC cannot work wonders, but talks create personal contacts and allow an exchange of ideas.

Before the European Community got down to the single European market in earnest neither the GDR nor her Comecon partners regarded it as necessary to acknowledge the Community formally.

In East Berlin there might have been fears that the privileges linked to intra-German trade through the GDR's special status might be endangered. But by neglecting to recognise the EC trade with the remaining EC countries has been negligible.

In 1988 about 80 per cent of the GDR's exports to the West, valued at 2.27bn East Marks, excluding exports to the Federal Republic, went to the European Community.

But intra-German trade alone was three times greater than trade with all the other EC countries put together. Total EC trade with East Germany is no greater than trade with Tunisia or Norway.

The GDR's best interests would be served by increasing trade with the 12 member-states of the European Community. An agreement with the EC affecting the preferential treatment for intra-German trade, allowed until now, would change nothing in the foreseeable future.

This treatment is enshrined in a protocol to the Treaties of Rome and so far

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PERSPECTIVE

History puts in a demand for retribution as a Marxist-Leninist facade collapses

"A revolution is the return from the artificial to the real".- Victor Hugo, *Les Miserables, 1862.*

What is happening in East Germany is the result of a political landslide in the heart of Europe.

The rebellion of freedom is brushing aside the living lie of the socialist German state. History demands retribution.

Whole armies of Communist party bureaucrats, privilege-laden personifications of this lie, are being buried in its wake. Those left behind, the people, are now faced by the legacy of misspent years.

At the head of a new government and with the help of a Politburo reduced from 21 to 11 members, new prime minister Hans Modrow now hopes to salvage some kind of future for the totally discredited and irreparable ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED).

During his speech at the central committee meeting on 8 November, the party leader, Egon Krenz, warned delegates to show vigilance towards the "enemies of socialism", who are "unbridledly intervening in the domestic affairs of the people of the GDR and taking advantage of its justified demands."

Each of these absurd words costs Krenz another 100 or so East Germany who evade the status of mere vassals by fleeing to the West.

Although the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes this influx of human talent and a zest for life it already has human and material resources in abundance; one can only hope that East Germany does not lose its best assets. But before things get better they can be expected to get worse.

The man on the street in the GDR will have to pay the price for a further deterioration of the already extremely poor services in the GDR. Ordinary citizens will have to endure the mockery of half-hearted reforms, such as the excessively bureaucratic new travel legislation.

Yet the path to renewal is clearly signposted: free elections, abolition of the political penal law as well as of a constitution which weighs heavily on the citizens of the GDR.

Now that demonstrations have forced many members of the old guard to step down from power it is time to change the ideological basis of that power, first and foremost Article 1 of the GDR "constitution":

"The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants. It is the political organisation of the working people in urban and rural areas under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party."

Not one of these equations is valid today: neither the "political organisation of the working people" nor the order defined as subject to "the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party."

They expose the living lie of GDR society, a lie which existed partly because of inadequate protest and partly because of the lack of any means of articulating that protest.

It was only able to exist as a facade. *In this form* it has become a footnote of history.

No-one can claim that Mikhail Gorbachov was unable to foresee this development after introducing perestroika into Eastern European politics like the germ of an infection.

It is no coincidence that the right of all states to self-determination is being proclaimed in the capital of orthodox Communism.

This approach is rooted in a new cost-benefit annlysis, which has already characterised Soviet thinking for some time.

The USSR has stopped lending support to Communist brother parties.

This is the real revolution which made events in Hungary and Poland, and subsequently in the GDR, possible in the first place.

It led to a second revolutionary change in the Soviet approach: *states able to shape their own destinies are much more useful to Moscow security interests than states subjected to socialist oppression.*

The price Moscow had to pay to sustain its formerly chronic security phobia can no longer be paid by a worn out "empire."

Not only was Communism unable to defeat its ideological enemy — the West; the historical detour called socialism led socialist societies to the brink of ruin. The collective of socialist states fell further and further behind in international development.

The East-West conflict has long since assumed the problematic character of North-South relations. The number one crisis in the Old World has increasingly become the economic gap between western and eastern Europe.

The Soviets themselves speak most frankly about this fact. Talking to a high-ranking German visitor, for example, Valenin Falin said: "Socialism — that always means war against your own people."

Ruling elites which treat themselves to the luxury of jeopardising the survival of their societies to ensure personal survival are elites which cannot stand up to the challenges of history.

They also fail to satisfy the demands of the new patriotism: to act out of the desire to prevent one's own people from falling hopelessly behind others.

Under the condition that the German Question does not move beyond and thus threaten existing borders in Central Europe as it develops along the guideline of self-determination an economically recovered "Central Germany" is a much more useful partner for the Soviet Union than the former ossified GDR, which artifically kept the best talents of the East German population under lock and key.

Today, this aspect is given absolute priority in Moscow. In comparison, even the question of the future governmental organisation of the two Germanies pales into insignificance.

It is easier to view this subject with greater composure once there is greater clarification about what best serves one's own interests.

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Over the years we have grown used to the fact that it is better not to mention the name "Germany" for fear that someone might get goose-pimples.

Furthermore, in view of the solidity of the Berlin wall we have forgotten how to conceptualise questions relating to a common perspective.

Now, however, following the opening of the borders, there are indications that the "German train" is moving faster than the European one.

European political integration is only making headway slowly. It is marked by imponderabilities, whereas the development of intra-German ties has a relatively clear timetable with attainable goals: self-determination in the GDR, then closer association with the Federal Republic of Germany, and finally a federation which could lead to an extended German federal state — on the basis of the federal post-war order as the most successful model in German political history.

Such a federal state would, of course, be a member of the European Community. How could it be otherwise? There is no need to already call for a "Germany conference" of the four victorious powers. This would only provide the Communist party in the GDR with a pretext for decelerating the process of freedom.

Bonn, however, must start developing ideas on the contours of future German history, even with the reservation of the decision yet to be taken by fellow Germans in the GDR.

There is no need to celebrate the roofing ceremony when digging the hole for the foundations; but the turning of the first sod should take place within the framework of a developing architecture.

General agreement was reached in the Bundestag on three points which Chancellor Helmut Kohl described as prerequisites for further assistance to the GDR: free elections, a multi-party system and the relinquishment by the SED of its power monopoly.

This already represents a striking renunciation of the previously vague wording of Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik and gives Bonn's voice a more distinctive pitch in international politics.

A little more composed self-assurance could be added, a feeling of pride that this development comes at a time when German democracy is firmly and safely established.

An appropriate time to do a good deed by presenting history with a larger Germany in the interests of peace.

Thomas Kielinger

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 10 November 1989)

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no EC member-country has challenged it. But in the long-term both German states must have recourse to an extensive trade arrangement for the whole of the Community. Future developments could easily raise the question among EC partners whether the special status of intra-German trade, originating from the 1950s, is justified for all time and under completely changed circumstances.

To this can be added the consequences of the single European market. Until now there have been extensive opportunities to trace any shifts in German trade, but with the abolition of frontiers and bringing taxes into line it will become more difficult to prevent the illegal re-export of tax-free GDR goods.

The more GDR products have free access to the whole of the EC through treaty arrangements will controls within the Community become unnecessary.

Wilhelm Hadler

(Die Welt, Bonn, 8 November 1989)

SECURITY IN EUROPE

Shifts in German Question factors forcing Nato to boost its political role



The rapid sequence of events in East Germany has suddenly thrust the Federal Republic on to centre stage in the Nato Alliance.

Nato's most important task now is to adjust security plans to take into account the changes in Eastern Europe and the opening up of the East German frontier.

The Western Alliance will strengthen its political functions and go beyond the aims which were included in the communiqué issued after the last summit conference in May.

The far-reaching changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union mean that strengthening the core of Nato and maintaining America's commitment to Western Europe remain the most important elements in a new European peace policy.

The security and stability of Europe stands or falls with this, even if the aims of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe are to be achieved: bringing about a reduction of the military potential between the Atlantic and the Urals to a balanced situation by the removal of attack capabilities.

In spite of the Soviet desire to dissolve both alliances, Nato and the Warsaw Pact, Moscow party boss Mikhail Gorbachov does not intend to abandon the guarantees which are provided by the American presence in Western Europe, because they represent a protection against an escalation of the changes in Eastern Europe.

Coping with the difficulties as a consequence of recent events, particularly in East Germany, calls for perceptiveness, imagination and a clear recognition among the Alliance partners that there has been no change to the facts involving security.

The Alliance must not let itself be moved by emotions. By so doing the Alliance helps to strengthen the reform movement in Eastern Europe and the GDR, and can look towards a future in which the Cold War is no more.

Nato will consider these matters before its winter conference, which will take place just two weeks after the meeting between President Bush and Gorbachov on naval vessels off Malta.

In Brussels no one disputes that there has been a shift in the factors surrounding the German Question, and how the Western allies should adjust jointly to the changes in the GDR; the opening up of the frontier dividing the two Germanies and what has happened in reality, the demolition of the Berlin Wall.

How can the concealed concerns about the Federal Republic and its future be discussed openly by our neighbours and how can fresh impetus be given to European unity?

It seems that the statements made by the Federal Republic's neighbours, frequently repeatedl over the past 40 years about the German Question, reunification and Berlin, are being put to the test faster than many planners had thought possible.

Nato has to accept that, despite the commencement of the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, not much has changed as regards Warsaw Pact conventional superiority in tanks, armoured personnel carriers and troops.

The Western Alliance faces a modern, operational military power, geared to overrunning territory with speed. There are still 360,000 Soviet troops stationed in the GDR.

Four divisions will be withdrawn as a result of Gorbachov's decision to reduce forces facing the West. This year the 25th and the 32nd armoured divisions of the Red Army were disbanded, although only 15,000 men will return to the Soviet Union. The remaining servicmen will be re-grouped in East Germany.

It is doubtful that these plans would have been drawn up in the Kremlin in view of the internal changes in the GDR. Soviet representatives at the non-nuclear arms talks in Vienna, which began in March this year, said that Moscow was just as much surprised with the development of events since Honecker's fall as was the West.

At the very beginning of the new round of talks in Vienna it was clear that the Russians went along with the Nato proposals for stabilisation and troop reductions, and are trying hard to show the Soviet defence strategy has been changed.

At the same time the recent Soviet demand to include naval forces in the negotiations is evidence that Moscow is trying to weaken the supply lines across the Atlantic.

France and Britain have urged caution after the opening up of the GDR frontier. It would be a nightmare for Paris and London were the Federal Republic to abandon Nato and the European Community.

Hence the calls for a strengthening of the Community, for swift action to complete the single European market and the request for Bonn to keep a cool head.

But these thoughts disregard the realities. The Federal Republic is today in Nato and the EC, is participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and is as such a part of Western Europe.

It is a dangerous game to *conjure up* German misgivings, which do not exist but which could arise, if Bonn put at stake the inclusion of the United States and Canada in Europe's destiny. There are *no signs of* this.

The strength and force of attraction of Western Europe is based on the fact that there is a Transatlantic *alliance*. Disbanding it would be a *retrogressive step* into "Fortress *America*." Western Europe would then appreciate that it is incapable of coming to terms in a security sense with the changes in Eastern Europe.

For the time being the security structures in the East and the West must be maintained and then altered sensibly. That will take time. The Western Alliance must steadfastly press ahead in the narrow area between spontaneous enthusiasm and sober, practical-political lines of reasoning.

So the German Question still remains a part of the great task of drawing the final line under the post-war *period*.

Jan Reifenberg

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 November 1989)

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the European Community into a European union.

This last-named task will gain marked momentum now many neighbouring countries feel the need to commit the Federal Republic even more firmly to its ties with the West. This need can be put to use in achieving genuine European objectives.

The CSCE process in particular will gain fresh significance and momentum, maybe as a model for other crisis zones too.

An objective of the greatest importance, even above and beyond the partly outmoded parameters of the January 1989 CSCE final document agreed in Vienna, would be to progress swiftly from conference diplomacy to a phase of instrumentalisation.

Ideological talkathons on human rights such as seriously hampered the environmental affairs conference in Sofia are no longer what is needed. What is needed is a framework on the basis of which life can take shape in freedom and dignity.

Preparations for the Bonn CSCE economic affairs conference, to be held next March, will be particularly important in this connection, and it will be for the German Federal government as the conference host to pave the way and mark out the direction.

Anyone who is at a loss what to say or do could do worse than to take another look at the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

It has put the Europeans on the right path so far and contains all the answers to the questions that now arise.

It incorporates all the essential features of a European peace order that is no longer a pipe dream.

Dialogue and cooperation are the keywords, and neither could be more urgently needed.

Wolf J. Bell

(General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 13 November 1989)

Nato ready to take the first step first

The bewildering array of disarmament initiatives launched aggressively over the past year by the Soviet Union caused fits of constricted breathing among members of the Western Alliance.

The tough wrestling for answers at the last Nato summit in May is still bright in the memory.

But the political changes now sweeping the East Bloc, especially those in East Germany, have transformed the breathing difficulties into something more asthmatic — a state of health caused by pure confusion.

Hasty statements from Nato headquarters support this view. Just a few hours after the opening of the GDR frontier Manfred Wörner, Nato secretary-general, explained that the Western Alliance was following these events closely, and that they demonstrated once more the convincing powers of the democratic ideal which the Western Alliance represented.

Statements of this kind are obligatory from a senior representative of Nato, espacially as they can be interpreted in various ways.

Herr Wörner, former Defence Minister in Bonn, expressed another idea more precisely. At a meeting in Brussels he spoke of a possible reunification of Germany, which in his view this process could be ushering in.

He said that the status quo in Germany cannot be maintained for ever adding, however, that changes taking place in the East would not present grounds for abandoning the Alliance.

If the Alliance is not to be disbanded this then means that the Federal Republic, with the largest armed forces in Western Europe, must continue to be one of the most important corner-stones of the Alliance.

Did Herr Wörner mean that a reunified Germany would be a member of Nato? Such a contradiction does not call for explanation. He was speaking for himself.

But Manfred Wörner must know that neither the USA nor the Soviet Union want to shake the foundations of both alliances, Nato in the West and Comecon in the East.

A reunified Germany as a Nato partner would presuppose the withdrawal of the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Pact.

Recently Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has repeatedly suggested the dismantling of both alliances, which was promptly rejected by the West.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's offer was rather a leap into the future. Nato is in a relatively stable political situation; the Warsaw Pact is in ferment.

Poland is an important member-nation and has shown its communist government the door.

In Hungary the government has consigned Marxist-Leninist ideals to the files. And it is doubtful if this government in Budapest *will* remain in office after the parliamentary elections arranged for next year.

Shevardnadze's spokesman, Mr Gerassimov, clung on to the approach that the government could change but international obligations would remain.

Speculations about the disbandment of the Nato Alliance is just an intellectual exercise as far as Mr Gerassimov is concerned. He said the GDR would remain a stategic component of the Warsaw Pact.

The West must take to heart the advice not to make the second step before the first has been taken.

There is some point in exploiting to the full present opportunites for disarmament at more levels. This is all the more valid since in Vienna, where negotiations are under way for the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, and in Geneva, where the Americans and the Russians want to achieve controls over stategic weapons, the outlook for success in both is better than it has ever been.

A discussion about the further existence of the defence alliances can cause confusion. The laborious assessment of weapons on both sides, and their division into various and comparable categories as a requirement for reducing armaments, would be far-reaching.

Certainly it has to be borne in mind that both alliances are not only military but also political organisations. But the real decisions about changes will be mainly in the interests of the superpowers. Both the Federal Republic and the Nato secretary-general can therefore only be observers watching over the fence.

Ewald Stein

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 13 November 1989)

FINANCE

How East Germany got to the brink of ruin

The author of this article, Professor Hermann von Berg, is an economist. Until he left the GDR for the Federal Republic in 1986 he was head of economics at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. For many years he was a close associate of and adviser to GDR Premier Willi Stoph.

The Socialist Unity Party (SED) has so far given the lead in the GDR. But where has it led it? To the brink of disaster.

It has reduced what used to be the most creative, the most productive part of Germany to the level of a developing country only half as productive, in per capita terms, as the Federal Republic of Germany.

A party that has done the people such lasting damage must step down. The Opposition, which as yet lacks an economic concept of any kind, must insist on the resignation of the SED's chief economic ideologist, Otto Reinhold.

Professor Reinhold has upheld his clumsy economic policy concept to the last. Only now has he suddenly, flexibly, discovered "market-oriented economic planning."

What is it? Political democracy and an effective, social market economy coupled with a party-political monopoly and a "democratised" system of socialist mismanagement?

Will bureaucrats continue to fix prices arbitrarily, or will that be left to the pressure of genuine competition?

Can one define as a market a system in which prices and subsidies amount to officially organised chaos and there is no objective yardstick by which efficacy can be measured on the basis of the ominous principle of socialist performance?

The true reformers — the democrats and not the "democratisers" — must arrive at a decision. There is no third road midway between the capitalist market and the socialist plan.

The elimination of the market brought about by the abolition of money took Russia to the brink of ruin between 1917 and 1921.

In 1921 Lenin's New Economic Policy reintroduced money and the market yet retained planning, even planned prices.

This is the third road that combines communist and capitalist features. Neither [illegible] socialism.

The principle of economic accountancy was introduced at the same time, envisaged as profit-oriented production on a performance basis subject to financial control, but never worked.

It is a hybrid that can but vegetate. Prices can only be either bona fide market prices or bureaucratic sham prices.

Seven reform waves of this system have failed in the Soviet Union, three in Comecon, the East Bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The Yugoslav alternative has failed too, as has socialism all over the world. Socialism has transformed the richest part of the world into the poorest of the industrialised countries.

Terror, exploitation, mass pauperisation and, in effect, ecocide practised against one's own people were and are socialism as practised, regardless of the nameplate, whether "real," i.e. East Bloc, or democratic.

No economy can get by without a combination of state and market economy mechanisms, but the crucial question is which decides the issue. Does the market mechanism prevail over the state mechanism or vice-versa?

Where the world market prevails, the economy flourishes. Where bureaucrats practise a system of state control monopolised by one political party they destroy both freedom and affluence.

Each system has its own objective inner logic.

In the GDR the decline of socialism has hitherto been braked for traditional and national reasons.

According to estimates by Professor Dieter Voigt of the Ruhr University, Bochum, the GDR benefits to the tune of between DM6bn and DM7bn a year from the planning reserve fund administered by the Chancellor's Office in Bonn — in exchange for about DM800m in actual returns.

The Russians subsidise the GDR's economy to a similar extent. Yet the East German mark is worth only about 10 pfennigs in trade with the West — according to the latest official SED figures.

The more loans have been granted to the East as a whole, the feebler the system has grown, degenerating to the point of insolvency.

The GDR is ruined and can solve neither present nor future tasks without productive assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany.

What is the solution? In political terms, a pluralistic democracy that reactivates the devastated desire to perform and offsets the demotivation and passive resistance of the producers.

In economic terms, in a social market economy that minimises losses, makes profits possible and thus raises funds to meet the cost of social, economic and ecological needs.

The reactionary monopoly on power held by the SED must be broken and a democratic government elected. It must start, without delay, to set about safeguarding energy supplies.

In 30 years the GDR has succeeded in installing nuclear power capacity sufficient to meet about 10 per cent of its needs. Where is the rest to come from when open-cast brown coal reserves are exhausted 20 to 30 years hence?

Who is to ensure the GDR's economic survival? Can the present policy be continued, given the shorter life expectancy and the highest increase in serious respiratory complaints in Europe (the GDR can't afford to instal smokestack desulphurisation plant either)?

How is the chemical industry to be restructured? How are the cities and the GDR's technical and social infrastructure to be streamlined and renewed?

These are not, by any stretch of the imagination, all the questions that arise. But what is the Opposition in the GDR to do?

First, it must ensure that free elections are held and that it comes to power to save country and people.


Second, a new system of commercial law must be introduced, with mixed intra-German joint stock companies that pay part of their wage and tax bills in (Western) deutschemarks.

Companies of this kind must be set up and extended to include enterprises in the commercial, services, trades and health sectors.

Third, goods and services must be made fully convertible, failing which the

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Portrait of an economy gagged by central-planning bureaucrats



Party cadres will need to rethink now even SED general secretary Egon Krenz, the East German leader, has proclaimed a "market-oriented socialist planned economy" concept.

Old textbook axioms that have been hammered into generations of GDR managers by economists will need to be thrown overboard.

So will much more, such as the constrol structure of the economic system up to and including the management of individual enterprises.

Despite a number of adjustments made in recent years the GDR's economy is still regimented by a system of government bureaucracy.

The major targets are set by the politburo of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). One rung further down the ladder the planning commission draws up proposals by which to achieve these objectives.

It, together with a plethora of Ministries, decides what shape the economy is to take. It specifies, for instance, how much is to be invested and how much is to be spent on consumption.

The targets it sets are fixed and inflexible. The 130-odd combines which, with a payroll of about 25,000 each, are the backbone of the GDR's economy, are ordered to manufacture a specific quantity of machinery, cars, building *materials or foodstuffs.*

They are also told how much money they will have available to invest and where they are to order the steel and sheet metal they need to produce their goods and meet their targets.

Critics have repeatedly dismissed this system as a "tonnage ideology," and the implicit irony is far from unjustified.

When you are constantly told how many tons of sheet metal must run through your roller mill you are likely, in case of doubt, to process thicker sheet metal, not thinner grades, even if customers might clamour for the latter.

By rolling thicker grades you will certainly fulfill your plan commitments. But the GDR has come to realise that such coarse planning mechanisms are unsuitable.

Greater "freedom" for individual enterprises is the latest catchword. They must earn their own funds. That means they can no longer rely on state funds to meet the cost of their investments; they must earn at least enough in profits to finance depreciation.

This arrangement is already in force experimentally in 16 combines, but they are all, gradually, by 1995, to switch to this system.

But progress to date, on the basis of the approach so far adopted, has been most half-hearted, or so experts at the DIW economic research institute, Berlin, say.

Investment implementation, for instance, is still controlled by a number of state agencies, including the government audit office and the price control authorities.

The crux of all planning in the GDR continues to be a strongly centralised system of drawing up balance sheets. Over two thirds of the GDR's total manufacturing output is covered by the state planning and Ministerial balance sheet system.

That has consequences. The authorities associated with this comprehensive drafting of balance sheets, including the various industrial Ministries, by no means always follow the same policy line.

The daily grind of a works manager in the GDR includes being entitled to buy new machinery, subject to approval by his superiors, but not having it delivered because his supplier has failed to secure approval of the components needed to manufacture it.

Managerial staff in the GDR may be imaginative and past masters at improvisation and organisation, but that will not invariably solve the problem.

Managements accustomed to a constant shortage of supplies will fill their stores with goods they don't need themselves but which others lack. Stone Age bargaining and exchange of goods then take place.

This reversion to prehistory is no coincidence. The prices charged for goods ranging from bread to cars are the result of government decisions. Planners may be able to appreciate the worst shortcomings but that doesn't, by any stretch of the imagination, mean they have then solve the problem.

That is because they are unable to judge the true worth of a product.

Supply and demand determine prices in a market economy, or so the standard West German economic textbooks say.

Need to establish *realistic prices*

This yardstick doesn't exist where market mechanisms are put out of action by state economic planning.

Yet without realistic prices enterprises can't do any meaningful cost accounting, and until they know what their costs are they can hardly find out whether they are running at a profit.

So they lack any incentive to step up their productivity, and material rewards such as bonuses are no help as long as employees cannot buy what they need with their money.

And what they need is not available because what consumers want is not manufactured.

The lack of realistic prices is not the only cause of problems. Instructions from "above" are frequently contradictory, DIW economic researchers say.

A regional Party organisation may call on enterprises to manufacture more consumer goods, as part of the latest campaign, while industrial Ministries call on them to manufacture more capital goods and equipment.

The management is caught in a cleft stick but tries to reconcile these contradictory interests heedless of the cost, should that be how it must be.

Arriving at a "market-oriented planned economy" will be hard work in the GDR, where behaviour of the kind described has a long tradition.

The outlines of the "market-oriented planned economy" are still extremely vague. So planners can but echo Lichtenberg's words.

The 18th century German aphorist once said that everything must be different if it is to be better, but whether it then *will* be better is anyone's guess.

Ulrich Schreyer

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 11 November 1989)

FINANCE

German firms see long-term opportunities in Poland



The reactivation of the Polish economy presents German firms with a unique opportunity of cornering a long-term share of the Polish market.

There can be no question of making a quick profit, Projects must be planned in depth, says Karl-Hermann Fink, business manager of the Cologne-based East Bloc Trade Committee.

In an interview with *Handelsblatt* Dr Fink said the committee's main task, as he saw it, was to provide strictly practical assistance and advice with bilateral business ventures.

This is the context in which he sees the committee's activities with regard to Poland. They include a task force for joint ventures, a procurement campaign with the emphasis on textile processing and the establishment of an audit or assessment capacity for business projects.

A German business delegate is to be appointed and moves undertaken to promote training facilities for Polish managerial and other staff.

The proposed task force for joint ventures will clearly have a key role to play. There is not just keen interest in information about joint venture possibilities; there is also a considerable potential for business undertakings of this kind.

The potential Dr Fink sees includes, in particular, the production capacity, raw materials and manpower available.

Skilled workers are a bonus, as are managerial staff, although the latter may need training.

The task force is envisaged as a permanent body consisting of German and Polish experts, preferably entrepreneurs. They will discuss any and all issues that arise in connection with the establishment and operation of joint ventures.

The Polish members' brief will include dealing with individual mishaps or shortcomings or changing the rules as and when needed.

The task force will serve as a monitor, enabling Polish partners to see where problems arise from the viewpoint of their German counterparts.

It is, he says, to start work immediately.

The procurement campaign, which has also already begun, could prove equally examplary and effective inasmuch as it is practical in orientation.

The objectives are, for one, to show Polish firms what textile products they can expect to sell to Germany and to brief German customers on Polish production potential, helping to forge links between the two.

Making up finished products under contract from materials supplied could be extended now the latest aid package drawn up by the European Commission in Brussels has relaxed restrictions.

Assessing the viability and profitability of projects in Poland presents special problems. It is an essential prerequisite for the granting of Hermes export credit guarantees to finance projects.

Assessment, Dr Fink says, is underdeveloped in Poland. An assessment facility needs to be set up, jointly with Polish partners, as soon as possible.

Polish partners must, he feels, participate in any such facility — on both psychological grounds and for "educational" reasons.

Polish partners can then be acquainted with assessment methods. The human factor is what makes entrepreneurial cooperation with Poland particularly promising, he says. Polish workers are well trained and experienced.

There is even a reservoir of Polish managerial manpower, former managers of Polish state enterprises or from the country's economic administration "who are or have seized their opportunity."

Even so, further training is one of the main tasks that lie ahead in Poland, Dr Fink says. Western concepts of profitability and assessment must be taught.

The committee has plans to join forces with the Carl Duisberg Society and the Standing Conference of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry in setting up a training committee.

There are also plans to appoint a German industrial delegate based in Warsaw. He will work, in addition to the trade attaché and his staff at the German embassy, as an anchorman linking German and Polish business interests.

A delegate's office is usually the precursor to the establishment of a joint — in this case German-Polish — chamber of commerce.

Josef Abaffy

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 9 November 1989)

Soviet and Hungarian managers learn about management

The German Management Academy, just opened in Celle, is still in its early days. Arrangements are still fairly makeshift.

Yet a group of Soviet managers, led *by a deputy minister, are already* undergoing management training in this picturesque small town near Hanover.

They will spend four weeks in the Federal Republic learning personnel management, controlling and marketing theory.

But the East-West Academy, as it has been dubbed in view of the high percentage of management trainees from Eastern Europe, will not move into its majestic new quarters for two years.

In the meantime a disused labour exchange is being converted for use from next spring. Five seminars to be held between now and next spring, attended by Soviet and Hungarian managers, will be held at various venues.

The academy does not yet have full-time staff. Activities are arranged and coordinated by enthusiastic staff at the Economic Affairs Ministry, at Carl Duisberg centres and at the Lower Saxon Industrial Training Centre. The first group of Soviet trainees are particularly impressed by their hosts' flexibility. Swift and sound decisions taken on the decider's ... responsibility, ... initiative shown outside the framework of economic planning and overtime worked when needed are features of an economic system from which they are keen to learn.

"The higher a man's status, the less flexible he seems to be," says Wilhelm Dahms, an international training counsellor with Conti, the Hanover tyre manufacturers, whose brief was personnel management.

At the higher echelons of Soviet planning arrangements seem to be arbitrary. The middle management has to carry the can, being caught between arbitrary instructions from above and the needs of people at lower levels who would prefer consistency.

Some trainees note down every word. "They will guard what they have learnt here like treasure trove and put it into practice back home as their very own.

Continued on page 15

Loans and export credit plan to help Warsaw

The German Federal government has agreed to lend Poland DM3bn over the next three years, including DM2.5bn in Hermes export credit guarantees.

The offer was made to Polish Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Balcerowicz by Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Helmut Haussmann.

A further DM500m will be an initial German contribution toward the so-called Bush initiative; the US President offered the Polish government $1bn in Western aid, of which Washington was to supply $200m.

During the German-Polish *talks in* Warsaw overall provisions for Poland's sovereign debts were discussed as a means of restoring Warsaw's creditworthiness.

Bonn will advocate further aid to Warsaw by the Paris Club to ease the pressure of Poland's foreign debts.

That, however, *presupposes* Poland coming to terms with the IMF.

A debt rescheduling agreement between Bonn and Warsaw was signed not long ago. It applied to DM2.5bn in payments due by the end of last year.

Rescheduling payments due this year and next would ease pressure on Poland by about DM13bn, including DM2.3bn due to German creditors.

The Bonn government has virtually waived repayment of a jumbo loan made to Poland in the 1970s. DM760m has been remitted and a further DM560m converted into a zloty fund to finance projects of interest to the *two countries*.

German businessmen who accompanied Chancellor Kohl's delegation to Poland conferred with Premier Mazowiecki to sound out the prospects of improving the mutual exchange of goods.

A number of extra activities by the German business community have been arranged. Retail trading groups, for instance, plan to step up their imports of consumer goods from Poland.

Many German firms have come up with new export ideas: not just capital and consumer goods but, in particular, used machinery and equipment.

The advantage of second-hand equipment is both the price and the fact that it can be put to use straight away and manned by conventionally trained staff.

Even so, Poland's chronic *shortage* of foreign exchange will *pose serious problems* in connection with *these* attempts to forge new commercial and industrial links.

(Bremer Nachrichten, 10 November 1989)

MOTORING

The Trabant put-puts West, bringing its smoke with it

The Trabant, the ugly little East German car with the smoke-belching two-stroke engine, has become a common sight on West German roads since the second week this month. West German motorists have been warned to be careful because accidents involving Trabis are increasing. They are slow and, because of their dull tail lights, are hard to see at night, especially by drivers of BMWs and Mercedes hurtling along the no-speed-limit autobahns. This story appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The Trabant, an outmoded two-stroke small car made in Zwickau, East Germany, may be a gas guzzler and a vehicle emission offender, but it has shown its mettle since the GDR opened its borders to let East Germans travel to the West.

An old-timer by Western standards, but still running off the assembly lines for a long waiting list of would-be car-owners in the GDR, the Trabant, fondly known as the Trabi, was seen by the thousand as East Germans queued to pass the border between Czechoslovakia and Bavaria.

Now the GDR has opened its borders with Berlin and the Federal Republic, West Berliners and West Germans will have found out at first hand what it is like to queue behind a dozen Trabis at a crossroads as they belch noxious exhaust fumes into the night air. By 9 November, the day on which the GDR authorities decided to let East Germans visit the West, triggering a mass trek over the weekend, over 16,000 GDR-registered vehicles (and their owners) had headed west.

Well over half are Trabants. The vest-pocket Trabant is much more popular in than the Wartburg, which is driven, among others, by the police.

It does have a certain flair. The Landesmuseum in Brunswick and the Deutsches Museum in Munich have both invested in a Trabant as an exhibit. It looks so small and helpless, like a toy car, that it automatically rouses protective instincts — and not just among ADAC road patrolmen.

Appearances are deceptive. The Trabi has run off the assembly lines almost unchanged since 1964. The Zwickau works has manufactured 2.5 million Trabis with their plastic car bodies mounted on a pressed steel frame.

The Trabi's 594cc two-stroke engine comes in the motorcycle category, but it only has to move an unladen weight of 615kg (1,353lb, or 12cwt). It is 3.51 metres (11ft 6in) long. The 26hp engine reaches a top speed of roughly 100kph (62mph). Fuel consumption is about 10 litres per 100km, or 30mph, which makes it a gas guzzler by today's standards.

The two-stroke engine is scheduled to be retired next year. It will be replaced by a four-stroke engine manufactured under licence from Volkswagen that will take it to a breathtaking 40hp and 125kph (78mph). Two dealers in the Federal Republic, one in Hanover, the other in St Augustin, near Bonn, claim to be able to supply most spare parts that are likely to be needed.

A triumph of Communist technology, planning and management ... the Trabant. (Photo: dpa)

Neither care to say how they come by them. In the past they have mainly mailed them to the GDR on payment in hard currency. The influx of Trabis in the West has added another string to their bow.

Vehicle licensing regulations had to be amended to allow Trabis to be driven regularly by residents of the Federal Republic. A special exemption was granted at the beginning of October.

All cars brought over to the West by East German refugees were exempted from compliance with vehicle emission and noise abatement regulations. Vehicle licensing procedures (for re-registration in the West) have been simplified too. Owners have 20 days' grace before they need to re-register and re-insure their vehicles in the Federal Republic. For 20 days they have complimentary insurance cover.


They may be resold — and the demand is there. Many dealers have persuaded refugees to part company with their cars while they are still being processed in transit camps.

They resell them in the GDR, where used cars can cost more than new ones (for which there is a waiting list of up to 15 years). The Trabi has made new friends in the West too. As the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit* has rightly observed:

"The Trabi seems to prove the good luck we had with our 'economic miracle' system in the West. It symbolises socialism as the huffing, puffing loser."

Boris Schmidt

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 November 1989)



POLITICS AND THE ARTS

Leipzig: music, demonstrations, rumours and the individualism of a Heldenstadt

The city of Leipzig has been the scene of some of the most fervent anti-government demonstrations. Leipzigers have come to dislike central control from East Berlin even more than people in other centres — which is saying something. The city is one of he most run-down in East Germany — which is again saying something in a country where building decay is the norm. With events now in Berlin moving with bewildering speed many people were for a time unable to separate rumour (has the Berlin Wall been pulled down?) from fact. Monika Zimmermann reports on Leipzig and the North Rhine-Westphalia Culture Week Connection for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Disbelieving and stunned Leipzigers turned for help to people from North Rhine-Westphalia who happened to be in Leipzig for the North Rhine-Westphalia Culture Week.

The Germans from the West must know more about events. But they didn't. Those in Leipzig and elsewhere in East Germany were more mystified than the locals.

Kurt Masur, conductor of the Gewandhaus Orchestra, said when he tried to explain the Leipzig situation to journalists from North Rhine-Westphalia: "You must have lived here for some time to understand what is happening here now."

He said that even in East Berlin, as events had shown, people did not know a lot about what the situation was in other parts of the country.

Just how far East Berlin is from Leipzig can be seen from the fact that the story spread like wildfire that the Wall in Berlin had been demolished.

At a reception by the Mayor to open the Culture Week, a young man from Leipzig excitedly reported that people were now allowed to go from the East to the West and return.

But many could hardly believe it. They just shrugged their shoulders. One said: "That's marvellous for the people in Berlin but what does it do for us?"

Another said: "Going in and out of the country has not been our main problem for a long time."

The previous evening there had been nothing like the excitement when the first trains left Leipzig station for West Berlin as there had been the night before in Berlin at the Wall.

Leipzig people have for a long time felt that the capital in East Berlin has neglected them. They are used to not expecting anything good to come out of the capital. They even distrust good news.

They remain sceptical. They won't change until they are involved in progress themselves. This feeling of dependence on the central authorities has been crippling them for a long time. Now they are in a position to take their own destiny in their hands.

This is why they were cautious about the news on the evening of 9 November, even through no one tried to make a secret of their excitement. They were proud that they had actually had a hand in creating the situation.

For several days the notice with the city's name on it on the road into Leipzig has displayed the words: Leipzig — City of Heroes of the German Democratic Republic.

Writer Christoph Hein made the suggestion that Leipzig should be described as a "Heldenstadt," city of heroes, at the large demonstration in Berlin.

His reason was that the Monday demonstrations, staged by the people of Leipzig, were decisive for what has happened in East Germany.

The citizens of Leipzig have now taken up this matter of the "Heldenstadt" themselves. The times of instructions from "the capital" are past.

At a press conference, Masur cleared up the tale, which was being spun in Berlin about Leipzig, with the words: "I am not remote-controlled."

In Berlin Egon Krenz is regarded as the saviour of Leipzig and is being built up as such by his party comrades.

Speaking to the international press politburo member Günter Schabowski gave the Berlin version of the events in Leipzig on 9 October.

The main point he made was that Egon Krenz had personally intervened so that no conflict developed between the custodians of the law and the demonstrators.

Speaking of the day which was so decisive for Leipzig and the GDR, Masur said: "We six were quite alone and made our involvement dependent on the fact that the police would not interfere in any way."

There is no denying that he and five others broadcast over Radio Leipzig an appeal in which they said that it was of immense importance that further demonstrations in the city should be non-violent and peaceable.

Since then Masur has been not only the internationally-famous conductor of Leipzig's internationally famous Gewandhaus Orchestra but also he is celebrated on the streets of the city as a man of the people.

The "Gewandhaus Talks," which take place every Sunday, have to some extent channelled dammed up displeasure into peaceful paths of dialogue.

But even if Masur wants to go into politics instead of making music, because "the sense of responsibility for my city" obliges him to do so, he does not want to see the North Rhine-Westphalia Culture Week events reduced, which were planned a long time ago, but which must appear to be out of place now.

He said: "The arts are enormously important for our people, and if it were not so they would not be so mature."

Just how mature they are can be observed every Monday evening, when hundreds of thousands flock to the streets without any incidents occurring.

But at the same time he does not conceal the fact that cultural exchanges with the Federal Republic are not so sensational as they once were.

What Dr Masur referred to-politely could be sensed more directly in Leipzig itself. Who is going to be interested in "Art and Culture" from North Rhine-Westphalia in these times, when most people are looking for their own identity and self-awareness, except a few culture vultures?

The audience for the official opening of the Culture Week in the Leipzig Opera House was very sparse — this would have been unthinkable just a few months ago.

But then no one would have thought it likely that only an acting mayor would speak, because the official mayor had resigned.

Johannes Rau, Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, turned up in Leipzig for the opening as planned. In view of the changed situation there was nothing more for him to say than a punning remark: "Auch Ratschläge sind Schläge," advice also has its impact.

There will be music, theatre, meetings with writers, painters and journalists from North Rhine-Westphalia in Leipzig over the next two weeks. Uwe Fischer, the city councillor for the arts, said encouragingly: "Look around at everything. We have nothing to hide."

Things were not always seen in that way, for immediately after Krenz came to power this NRW cultural event in Leipzig was cancelled by Berlin for reasons that came mainly from Leipzig.

Then Berlin thought the matter over and recognised the chances the event held out to simulate and conjure up normality, aided by culture, where for a long time a state of emergency had prevailed. This cannot be glossed over any longer.

The major exhibition, which North Rhine-Westphalia has brought to Leipzig, is called *Zeitzeichen*, (Time signal).

But in Leipzig people have for a long time recognised the sign of the times, even if it is something quite different from what is to be seen in the pictures.

Monika Zimmermann
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 November 1989)

Drum rolls as Günter Grass revisits Danzig

Günter Grass went to Gdansk for an exhibition of the drawings he did during his stay in Calcutta three years ago. But this soon became a secondary matter.

In view of the continuing debate about German reunification and the anxiety many Poles still have about the Germans, it must have been reassuring for Grass's audience when he said he also feared German reunification.

Writer Grass spent most of his time talking about German-German relations and about the current situation and the visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland.

The Polish press gave prominence to Grass's comments about German reunification, quoting him: "Reunification is the wrong expression. Our neighbours have justifiable fears of a strongly militarised Germany. But it is against the nature of things in Europe, that in the middle of the Continent there should be states, regarding each other in enmity, divided by a wall.

"I am for the GDR and the Federal Republic getting closer together, and I hope that as a consequence of the reforms which are beginning, glasnost and perestroika, the German Democratic Republic will go along the path taken by Poland and Hungary. I can, for instance, envisage a confederation of the two German states."

From then on there was not much talk about art and literature, but quite a lot about politics.

Grass himself said that he had come to Gdansk to hold high the flag of democratic socialism.

He said: "For decades a communist unity party had suppressed Polish social democrats and socialists, and corrupted the word socialism. It is now the time to show that there has always been a democratic socialism — underground."

Grass warned about idealising Western capital aid. He said: "There is the danger that Poland would become dependent on Western and Federal Republic capital."

A few years ago, during a visit to Gdansk, the city where he was born, Grass compared Poland to Nicaragua.

Poland's opposition regards the Sandinsts as mainly only a crowd of marionettes, remotely controlled by Moscow. There was a storm of protest in Poland's underground press.

Confronted about this on Polish Radio, Grass held to his comparison. He said: "Here, as in Nicaragua, there is a strong people's movement, supported by Catholic elements, against a dictatorship."

Solidarity sympathisers had motioned away all other West German Social Democrats: proof more of the sympathetic SPD attitude towards the communists. Furthermore Solidarity does not have the best memories of the Federal Republic's Social Democrats.

Nevertheless Grass, an SPD member, met Lech Walesa, when he was still persona non grata with the communists with whom SPD officials held talks.

His views, which lie between all Polish viewpoints, have not harmed his image in any way. Quite the contrary, in fact: in Poland and particularly in Gdansk he is the best known German-language writer.

When at the end of the 1970s the first underground publishing house came into existence, one of the first books it published was a complete translation of Grass's *The Tin Drum*.

For a long time the book could not appear legally. The censors regarded as unsuitable passages in it about the conduct of the Red Army in Poland and the expulsion of Germans from Poland.

But no book is so well known in Gdansk as this novel, particularly due to the colourful description of the defence of the Danzig telegraph building in September 1939. For 14 hours Polish postal workers held out against the onslaught of the German attackers, until they received the promise that they would be treated as prisoners-of-war. But they were all shot.

This event is just as laden with emotion in Poland as the defence of the Westerplatte in Danzig harbour in the first days of the war.

Many members of the audience brought along to the discussion their copies of *The Tin Drum* for an autograph from the author. Old, tattered, well-thumbed, partly yellowing copies were thrust under Grass's nose, including copies in German.

The university hall was full. Several hundred citizens had made their way to Sopot when the discussion took place. So many do not usually turn up for well-known Polish writers.

Klaus Bachmann
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 10 November 1989)

FILMS

Creeping glasnost sidles into East Germany

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The changes which have taken place in the German Democratic Republic over the past few months have brought with them changes to the irritating and arbitary decisions made by the political bureaucracy controlling the arts in the GDR.

One step has been that East Berlin has relented and the Russian magazine *Sputnik* can again go on sale in the GDR.

Then Soviet films *The Commissar*, made by Alexander Askoldov in 1967 but not released until 1988, *The Theme*, made by Gleb Panfilov in 1979 and released in 1986, Aleksandr Proshkin's *The Cold Summer of 1953, Spiele für Kinder* and *Und morgen war Krieg* will again be shown in the GDR. They were taken out of circulation in East Germany last autumn

Horst Pehnert, deputy Minister for the Arts and head of "Hauptverwaltung Film" in East Berlin, said this cancelled a decision which was "arbritary and without the agreement of those concerned, who were responsible for the purchase of these films and had had them dubbed and screened for the Soviet Film Festival."

The first two of these films have again been shown for a short time, but have only been screened in small out-of-the-way cinemas.

Pehnert said that the other films would be screened so that all those interested in them could see them.

Pehnert is a former editor-in-chief of the SED youth magazine *Junge Welt* and has been "Film Minister" since December 1976.

He has been silent for a year and has only recently spoken out again since Kurt Hager, Central Committee secretary responsible for the arts and sciences, and Hager's colleague, Ursual Ragwitz, head of the arts department on the Central Committee since 1976, have been sent into "well deserved" retirement.

Pehnert has also annnounced that *Repentance* by Tengis Abuladse, will also be shown in the GDR. Many have asked for this film.

"An instruction to purchase it has been given," he said. But it would have to be dubbed so it will be a few months before it will appear in GDR cinemas.

Pehnert said: "We have decided to dub the film ourselves because according to our experts the copy we already have is not dubbed very acurately in many parts."

When the film, reappraising the Stalin era, appeared on West German television there were slating reviews of it in the SED official daily *Neues Deutschland* and the youth magazine *Junge Welt*.



Off the banned list after 23 years, *Spur der Steine*. This scene is taken from the East German review, *Filmspiegel*, 1966.

Harald Wessel, deputy editor-in-chief of *Neues Deutschland*, wrote the criticism for his newspaper, and Klaus-Dieter Schütt, editor-in-chief of *Junge Welt*, wrote the slating review for his publication. Both still have their jobs and seem to be swimming nimbly with the times.

After the rehabilitation of the suspect Soviet films, another look is being given to East German films of the 1960s, languishing in the archives, which were never shown or shown only once.

These involve 12 feature-length films and almost 100 documentaries and films for television. A commission will look at these films and make proposals about which of them could be made available to the public and how they should be screened.

The recent revival of Frank Beyer's *Spur der Steine* in a film club performance in East Berlin is a hopeful sign that the GDR will be serious about naming by name the Stalinist repression measures of the past decades and make reparations to their victims. Over 20 years ago Beyer's film was suddenly take off, because allegedly the working class was falsely presented in it.

Today people in the GDR are clamouring for an opening up of the archives, and film directors have become embittered that their work has been put on ice and misused due to state control.

The new East German leader Egon Krenz must promise to draw up media legislation, which will prevent what happened to the five Russian films and the East German archives films happening again.

Peter Jochen Winter
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 6 November 1989)

Festival bids adieu to the Nordic cliche — sayonara

This year's Nordic Film Festival put on in Lübeck was an event for saying adieu to a whole list of clichés of the Scandinavian film.

Goodbye has been said to the hackneyed idea that Scandinavian films are just illustrative advisers for fathers and/or mothers of children endangered by neglect, women seeking self-gratification, and would-be foresters who at every possible and impossible opportunity had to break into song about the natural beauties of Scandinavia.

The natural world of Scandinavian is, indeed, still a component of Scandinavian films, but for some time now there have been some clear exceptions.

Perhaps it should be said that almost every film from Scandinavia is more or less a *Heimat* film, roughly meaning a film based on "the homeland."

One example is the richly impressionistic novel *Die Frauen auf dem Dachboden* by the Swedish writer Carl-Gustav Nykvist, which opened this year's Nordic Film Festival.

Another example was the Swedish film *Coq Rouge* by Pelle Bergland, a second-rate thriller dealing with the manoeuvring between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Swedish security police.

A third example was *Atlantic Rhapsody* by newcomer Katrin Ottarsdottir from Thorshaven, who for the first time in the long history of the Nordic Film Festival represented the Faeroe Islands.

Her film was at one and the same time delightful and instructive. The first lesson to be learned is that, contrary to expectations, Scandinavian film-makers can be very amusing.

The second lesson to be learned is that the film-makers' ironic and un spoiled look at their own homelands produces something other than just natural beauty.

The film shows that Thorshaven, which plays a part in *Atlantic Rhapsody*, is just like other large towns in Scandinavia with single-family homes and supermarkets.

The third lesson to be learned is that the simplest means are still the most effective.

Where does Katrin Ottarsdottir's simplicity lie in this, her first film? It lies mainly in the fact that she has directed the 52 takes of her film like a relay-race and linked them to one another and in this way it explores details. The film deals with two Thorshaven policemen looking for a runaway boy. They find him playing happily with stones by the side of the sea. They drive him home.

On the way they get the report of a bank robbery. They pursue the bank robbers. In due course they are stopped by an unusual woman (the good fairy?).

A funeral procession crosses the policemen's path. A mother sees the procession, which she knew about but had forgotten it. So she joined it, leaving her children whom she told to go on playing. A woman neighbour became aware of this and got very excited and so and and so on.

The simple is still the most effective . . . Katrin Ottarsdottir's *Atlantik Rhapsody*. (Photo: Nordic Film Festival)

The Nordic Film Festival jury took the view that this film was not only worthy of an award because it was as inspiring as it was simple, but because it was as vivid as it was instructive.

It was a sociological chain reaction, as it were, and not to be surpassed by epic films such as Ola Solum's *Landstreichern*, from the book by Norwegian novelist, playwright and poet Knut Hamsun who died in 1952.

On the contrary, this tear-jerker displays the Scandinavian propensity to over-do scenes and exaggerate self-admiration, which of course leds to the usual relapses — to wild-looking country faces in close-up, to hayfields in gleaming contre-jour photography and, naturally, to the obligatory dream lake in the tundra in the early snow.

As has already been said, what used to be the rule is now the exception, and ultimately the contemporary Nordic film has a more narrative quality, is more varied than it was five years ago. All in all the Nordic film has become much more impressive.

There have also been advances of another kind. The most noteworthy is that at the beginning of September two hundred film-makers from the five Scandinavian countries got together and set up their own lobbying organisation, the Association of Northern Film Directors.

Its purpose is to provide Scandinavian film-makers with a focus for their solidarity. They plan to make their views felt by talking, talking and talking about themselves and their work.

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MEDICINE

The Berlin Wall and lowering barriers between the mind and treatment

Doctors meeting in Giessen to discuss new approaches to medicine in general and psychosomatics in particular found their ideas being influenced by the holes that were being smashed into the Berlin Wall even as they spoke. Rosemarie Stein reports for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Hopes of a revolutionary change in our "elbows first" society from the fitness cult and from the overrating of medicine to greater respect for life were voiced by a doctor from the Federal Republic of Germany.

A Soviet specialist referred to the humanisation of medicine and to the establishment of a "Charity and Health Society" in the Soviet Union.

An East German speaker referred to what, for years, had been the growing importance of the individual in the GDR, which badly needed to convert medicine from being a mere repair service.

Entire sections of all three speeches could have been transposed without anyone being any the wiser, so universal, transnational and surprisingly uniform is "New Thinking" in the medical profession.

They were made at a scientific congress held in Giessen on the day after the intra-German border was thrown open, an event that overshone and changed the course of the proceedings.

The "departure from specialised limitations" that was felt by the organiser, the German College of Psychosomatic Medicine, to be desirable succeeded to a totally unexpected extent.

"For the Berlin Wall to come tumbling down is for me a symbol of New Thinking," said Frankfurt psychotherapist Michael Lukas Moeller.

The Wall, Professor Moeller felt, stood for a very detached manner of dealing with one another.

Psychosomatic medicine seeks to span the enormous distance between conventional medicine and everything to do with the mind. It itself thus constitutes New Thinking, a new approach to medicine as a whole.

This point was made in debate against the congress's subject heading "New Thinking in Psychosomatics."

New thinking is, of course, under way in psychosomatics itself. One key outcome has been its extension to include a social dimension.

The enormous importance of this dimension was stressed by Bundestag Speaker Rita Süssmuth in her congress address. It was read in her absence; she had flown to Berlin instead to take part in a demonstration.

Man in his totality of body and soul was always a social being, she said. Nowadays one must surely refer to health upsets or even diseases of society itself.

The breakneck pace of change, with which many people are unable to keep pace, and the "global challenges faced by mankind" triggered fears for the future, led to a drastic increase in the number of complaints and resulted in a withdrawal from politics or a drift toward political extremism.

Alarming social trends and the uncertainties and anxieties they caused were among the root causes of illness today, Frau Süssmuth said, agreeing with psychosomatic medicine.

She compared these views with the approach of the 19th century doctor,



with his emphasis on hygiene, who had sought to rid society of, say, TB patients and initially been viewed with hostility.

By no means all protagonists of the prevailing approach to medicine, mainly a physical approach, would have welcomed the characterisation of psychosomatics by their 19th century predecessors: as the medical faculty's philosophical department, a department in which a new view of medicine was being devised.

One of the pioneers of this new view is Horst Eberhard Richter, head of the Giessen centre for psychosomatic medicine, who made an indelible mark on the congress.

He impressively outlined the findings of a recent survey, including the decline of social sensitivity in the Federal Republic and the loss of the ability to suffer and to share suffering.

That, Professor Richter said, was why modern medicine often had difficulty with charity, or the spirit of mercy. It frequently registered hardship as a collection of data.

Then there was the ideology of feasibility, which despite all its partial successes was unable, in the final analysis, to surmount the fragility of man.

There were also pent-up fears for the environment and for the future. Given the destruction of natural living conditions even children today shared these fears.

They were fears that could no longer be eased by projecting them on to a "major political arch-enemy."

Fixed views of the enemy, he said against the background of general amazement at the popular uprising in the GDR, had been to blame for most people in the West failing to notice the gradual changes that had taken place there.

He had often been in the GDR in recent years and held discussions with groups of people who were devising new thinking, new forces, new strategies — and an enormous sense of solidarity by means of which to hold their own and to support each other.

Professor Richter felt that jubilation in the West about the victory achieved by people in the GDR had in some cases been caused by a feeling of guilt at having, to all intents and purposes, failed to keep track of the trend.

As in many other sectors, New Thinking had taken shape almost unnoticed in medicine in the GDR too. It had been doing so for many years, said Professor Michael Geyer, Leipzig, head of the GDR's Society for Medical Psychotherapy.

"Shaken with emotion and breathless at the pace of this movement, this revolutionary upsurge by an entire society," he first noted how Freud's "subversive thinking" had regained ground since the mid-1970s and psychoanalytically oriented forms of treatment suitable for everyday medical use had taken shape.

He then spoke out strongly, with unaccustomed fervour for the Federal Republic, of the need for a new medicine that must no longer treat the patient as its object; it must regard him as a subject and capable of both dialogue and interaction.

In his view medicine seemed to be one of the last strongholds of Old Thinking. "Medicine is an ultra-conservative system, as we can see in the GDR too."

As a university teacher one felt ashamed that no progress was being made at university and that arch-conservative academic structures stood in the way of the least change in medicine.

"That is the same in the West as it is in the East," he said. "Medicine in this old guise is the whore of each and every system. It adapts to all conditions, including totalitarian conditions, and perpetuates them."

As an authority seeking to strike a social balance it aimed at levelling out social conflicts that caused illnesses rather than at discussing them.

Professor Geyer envisaged a doctor who no longer lived off the immoral earnings of a profession that was a whore, that no longer reacted to every statement by the patient by resorting to medical measures.

He must appreciate the mental and social reality of the sick person and bear it in mind in caring for his fellow-human.

That was the only way in which the doctor could shoulder his political responsibility and place at society's disposal the potential for social criticism that medicine always had.

Warning against making political capital

He stressed that political capital must on no account be made out of the patient's hardship, as had been done by the Heidelberg patients' collective, a 1968 left-wing forerunner of the Baader-Meinhof urban guerrilla movement.

Professor Geyer felt social and structural change in industrial society to be so far-reaching that even the "social sub-system medicine" was compelled to change.

In a message of greetings to the GDR's Psychosomatics Association, with which cooperation was sought, people in the GDR were said to have achieved much for the social context of human health by means of their self-liberation.

Before the text was approved misgivings were voiced. Might sending a message of greetings couched in these terms not be felt to be arrogant? Delegates from the GDR dismissed any such fears.

"These are words we need," one of them said. "We need contact, dialogue, a common front in the fight for genuine democratic and ecological conditions."

A new struggle was already being ushered in: between one group that aimed solely at Western-style living standards and another that aimed at New Thinking — and new living.

"Your country too will be changed, depending on the outcome of this struggle," he said.

Rosemarie Stein

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 November 1989)

EAST GERMAN SPORT

Jumping for joy – but mainly for socialism

Egon Krenz, the brand-new general secretary of the East Berlin party, appeared on television. He was succeeding Erich Honecker, the old boss, who was being pensioned off.

Krenz said he was reminded of the day after figure skater Katarina Witt at the Olympic Games in Calgary last year when the official government and party paper, *Neues Deutschland*, ran a front-page photograph of the highly attractive Fräulein Witt. Never before had the paper (the grinding dullness of which is legendary.- Ed.) use such a big photograph and Krenz made the point that no other event or socialist statesman had ever been given this treatment.

The decision to use the photo in large format was taken not be the newspaper's sports staff, nor by the editor. It was taken by Honecker himself, a fervent fan of Fräulein Witt. He wanted to make it clear from one end of the country to the other what importance was placed in such success. Honecker had referred to the "loveliest face of socialism."

But, and Krenz did not mention this, that although the idea was received in the West as a nifty piece of newspaperwork, it was greeted by most East Germans with derision.

When Fräulein Witt later compered a rock concert in East Berlin, she got the message straight from the shoulder — she was hissed off the stage. Honecker calling. No thanks.

At the Munich Olympics in 1972, East German athletes won 20 gold medals. At Montreal in 1976, they won 40. Then, *Neues Deutschland* wrote: "It might seem perplexing to citizens of the German Democratic Republic, but inside two weeks, the name GDR has become a name in Montreal."

Manfred Ewald, then head of the East German sports association, said in Canada: "The GDR was barely known here as a socialist state. But now I think that millions of Canadians know better what GDR means." It was the breakthrough for East German sport, it was a victory for diplomacy in a tracksuit and short trousers.

For the sporting rise of the first German worker-and-peasant state was never out of pure enthusiasm for sport. And sports leaders in the country even in 1976 were not making any secret of it, as their official language shows: "The system of unofficial international ratings introduced by American reporters at the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles is today a legitimate way of comparing the capacity of athletes from both social systems." Naturally, by this yardstick, the socialist victory over capitalism could be proved."

And now? Is sport still a propaganda weapon of a state which has developed its pomposity to levels of absurdity? A state from which, of all people, the young are leaving in hordes? Do they have, as the East Berlin leadership believes, have such a special interest in sport?

One leading East German athlete now in the West who fears that allowing his name to be known would mean problems for his family, says: "The day will come in East Germany when the misuse of sport will be publicly denounced. Concrete questions about the sense of so-called socialist sport will be asked...

"And it will not only be seen just how much money but also how people have been misused in the interests of a crackpot ideology. It will be seen that preparation for war and the promotion of competitive sport go hand in hand, that the terminology and the logistics of both are similar." Support for competitive sport would decline. Sport was an important part of foreign policy under both the state founder, Walter Ulbricht, and Honecker. It was even used to deal with tension within the East Bloc itself in the difficult 1950s and 60s. When Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as party secretary general in 1971, he boosted sporting links with Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to help integration in the East European bloc.



Organised spontaneity in Leipzig. (Photo: Klaus Meliner)

In 1961, East Germany established sporting-political contact with Cuba with the aim of using Cuban sporting success to spread the attraction of socialism. Between 1976 and 1980, 98 sports coaches and other experts spent time in 19 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Since East Germany was founded in 1949, about 300 sports experts have helped in more than 25 countries. Can sport remain the top export product of East Germany?

Jörg Kotterba, former editor of the East Berlin magazine *Der Leichtathlet* (Track and Field) and sports correspondent for the (East) *Berliner Zeitung*, who now lives in the West, says: "Last year the cash allocation for GDR sport was cut by between 40 and 50 per cent. That hit leading sports clubs especially hard."

Despite the lack of hard currency and economic difficulties, a significant part of the national budget was allocated to sport every year. "The fact that the system was on the point of collapsing was kept quiet. And no one was in a position to establish how many billions actually were being spent."

Sport kept on showing it was a bottomless hole which was draining an already-weak economy: international sporting success brought no material advantage to the economy.

So can the regime maintain its attitude? No, says the anonymous athlete now in the West. "It's not possible on economic grounds. And in any case, functionaries can no longer entice young athletes to travel to the West. Nobody is going to torture themselves for years to receive expenses of five marks a day in West money.

"Another point: what has been happening in the past few years in Poland and Hungary and especially in the Soviet Union has also caused East German athletes to think things over. Many athletes now see that competitive sport is not what makes the world turn and that also in East Germany, sport must be put in its place. Its place should be as in democratic states where it is not something that is organised by decree from on high."

And what about the athlete as an ideal? Not any more. Five years ago, an internal East German survey showed that pupils regarded the idea of East Bloc sporting heroes as old fashioned. The move is towards other types of sport, tennis, riding, sailing, motor-sports, surfing and body-building. Angling is the most favoured leisure pursuit among men. The demand of the sports federation to "make a thousand tennis courts" is not an idle comment.

And now sports that have not been actively promoted by the state have been flourishing. The national hockey team which has qualified for the European championships has succeeded because of its own efforts. It owes nothing to state assistance. It just goes to show how sporting habits are changing.

Now the best-known sports reporter in East Germany, Heinz-Florian Oertel, demands open payment to athletes, something that would in fact be the ending of a system of shamateurism. State amateurs have always received money.

So, what will happen? Wolfgang Schmidt, one of the best discus throwers in the world who once spent 14 months in East German jails, fears: "not a lot."

GDR sport will retain its original structure. In my opinion, there will be variations only within the system because there is a shortage of competitors in all Olympic sports."

Kotterba: "Sport is a matter of prestige in East Germany, so they're not going to want to shake the system up, especially if what emerges is that which has ever since the advent of prestroika in the Soviet Union been advanced by the leadership of East Germany: socialism and democracy the East German way. Because the Soviet attitude that there are now more important things than sport won't be followed. More likely is that the changes will be tailored to the German mentality and changed in other ways and perfected and rationalised."

But how long would it be possible to keep this up? "Only as long as the people don't see through it and react against it," says the East German athlete. "But not yet, because the time is not yet ripe."

Klaus Blume

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 3 November 1989)

Games might become games once more

Soon, that sporting paradise of East Germany, will be like other sporting nations. That means that sport will soon in Leipzig, Dresden or Rostock be the best diversion there is in the world — and nothing more.

The dazzling array of medals East Germany has won over the past years will soon become just something to read about. Because sport the way it is being run now in East Germany is merely another image of the political picture.

Athletes have contributed most to the recognition of East Germany. They weren't called "diplomats in track suits" for nothing. They won and they won and they won until no one was able to ignore the country they competed for.

Many people in foreign countries, especially in Asia and Africa, even came to think of East Germany as being the biggest and most significant German state. That was the aim of Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, the first two party leaders.

The Medal War of the Nations (sometimes called the Olympic Games) was the ideal means of achieving this aim. At the apex of this strategy of achieving recognition were well-known sports, especially track-and-field events. Cyclist "Täve" Schur was appointed to the East Berlin parliament, the Volkskammer. Top athletes have privileges which only politicians and artists otherwise have. Now they are demanding both reforms and payment in hard currency. Times are a'changing. The main aim of top GDR athletes was to be able to travel outside their country. That was the greatest incentive to perform well. Now that everyone can travel, that privilege has disappeared.

Manfred Lehnen

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 11 November 1989)

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currency cannot be made convertible. Fourth, this progress toward full convertibility can be completed within five years, including a uniform economic and monetary system. It can be done, given West German technology, joint management and a free flow of manpower, capital and equipment within Germany.

Ludwig Erhard, Bonn Economic Affairs Minister from 1949 to 1963 and Chancellor from 1963 to 1966, accomplished this transition in the decade between currency reform in 1948 and full convertibility of the deutschemark. Fifth, patronising welfare and unproductive loan facilities must be scrapped and replaced by a productive, cooperative community of economic performance. That is how to earn and accumulate the funds needed to pay for urgently needed structural change. What is more, this process will eliminate unemployment and trigger a fresh economic miracle from which neighbouring countries, European Community and non-EC, will benefit.

Hermann von Berg

(Die Welt, Bonn, 14 November 1989)

HEALTH

Nurses' verdict on hospital doctors: rude inconsiderate, arrogant and tactless

DIE ZEIT

Medical sociologists Jürgen Wilhelm and Elke Balzer say nurses and orderlies in intensive care wards are "hopping mad about the system" and critical of the role played by doctors in their work.

Wilhelm, of Göttingen, and Balzer, of Hanover, questioned 34 nurses and orderlies, so they cannot be said to have interviewed a representative cross-section. But their survey is the first of its kind, and its findings are alarmingly negative.

They permit the conclusion that the doctor as a "drug," recommended by Hungarian psychoanalyst Michael Balint as the most important "medicine" on the road to recovery, is evidently prescribed too seldom in everyday hospital procedure.

The Göttingen nurses felt that doctors, instead of incorporating empathy and readiness to talk with patients as part of their treatment, tended to leave this "emotional work" to the nursing staff. Medical staff concentrated on the scientific and technological side of patient care.

Nurses felt they were left with much the worse share: too much work for too low wages, demanding work and diminutive prestige.

Yet the nursing elite is normally to be found in intensive care wards, where work is felt to be attractive.

In comparison with working conditions in ordinary wards it holds forth the prospect of privileges such as higher wages and promotion, greater job satisfaction, independent work combined with team work, and some degree of equation with the status enjoyed by medical staff, their work having more in common in intensive care.

Yet that evidently doesn't mean representatives of the two group get on better with each other. Balzer and Wilhelm came across many reservations and misgivings, especially among nursing staff about ward doctors.

Conflicts were felt to arise partly from strain caused by the system and partly from doctors' behaviour toward both patients and nurses.

Criticism of the system as voiced was criticism of the university hospital as a research facility. Many nurses and orderlies interviewed felt doctors experimented too much, used too much equipment, made (and concealed) mistakes.

Operations were not infrequently carried out for educational or training purposes, and even on patients who were terminal cases.

University hospital intensive care wards were criticised as a repository of the sickest and most ailing patients. Seriously ill patients who had long since been abandoned by other hospitals were accepted, arguably as human guinea pigs.

Intensive care meant maximum therapy, or treatment beyond the state of coma. Patients had often been medically given up yet continued to be kept mechanically alive. Doctors no longer put in an appearance, leaving nurses to maintain a constant watch on patients and their condition.

Similar complaints had it that doctors spent much less time at less regular intervals at the sickbed than nursing staff.

The higher a doctor's standing, the less time he or she spent on patients. Ward manpower and schedules (daily and weekly for doctors) were said by nurses to lead to doctors no longer, or barely, seeing the patient as a sufferer.

The result was that nurses took up the patient's cause, with the work that involved, such as reminders, requests, phone calls, running after doctors and remedying mistakes.

Nurses and orderlies were critical of the prestige and pecking order in the medical profession. Typical, they felt, was the dispute over patients and the right way of treating them.

There was competition between representatives of different schools of thought and forms of therapy on the one hand, while on the other colleagues held superior or subordinate rank in the hierarchical structure.

Rotation of doctors was felt to impose a serious burden on working relations between nursing and medical staff in intensive care wards.

Time and again fresh doctors who were not infrequently "young, inexperienced or pregnant" were assigned to intensive card wards for a three- or six-month stint.

In addition to these drawbacks of the system, respondents were critical of many doctors' behaviour too. It was said to be too coarse and brutal in their dealings with patients and at times outrageous in the way they dealt with nursing staff.

Mention was made of macabre jokes at the patients' expense, of coarse behaviour verging on brutality by the doctors, and of inadequate information given to patients.

Feelings of modesty went unrespected and the most fundamental laws of courtesy ignored.

Without warning or a word of greeting a patient's blanket had been stripped and work carried out on his naked body. In another case requests for drugs to ease pain had been ignored.

Doctors were felt to be equally unfeeling in their behaviour toward nursing staff, who felt they were subjected to insult and humiliation.

"Silly little nurses" were made to feel that they were "second-rate individuals." Surgeons were past masters of tactless behaviour. The arrogant way in which they dismissed nurses helping to change bandages and drain wounds as nincompoops whenever something didn't work at the first attempt infuriated nurses.

So did the typical doctor's tantrums when nurses proved unable to do work that ought, basically, to be performed by the doctor in any case.

Doctors were felt to be particularly unfair in venting their spleen on inexperienced nurses, ordering them about and making them work at the double even when they, the doctors, could do the work themselves.

In short, nursing staff accused their medical colleagues of arrogance and ignorance.

How did they handle these shortcomings? Balzer and Wilhelm say they tend to conceal their reactions, criticising, laughing or smirking behind the doctor's back.

They avoid contact with doctors, let doctors stew in their own juice with their errors and omissions, fail to remedy matters and call any but the doctor responsible. Hatred, annoyance and criticism are concealed.

Conflicts such as these ought to be dealt with by professionally supervised conversation groups, but groups are so far run at best in psychosomatic and psychiatric wards.

These problems are not publicly discussed at the professional level either. They certainly go unmentioned in the debate on the shortage of nursing care – even though that would be the only effective way of combating them.

Ellis Huber, president of the Berlin medical council, agrees. "If a nursing council, set up along lines similar to a medical council, were officially to state that doctors were useless," he suggests, "then the doctors would presumably have to change" — and, arguably, the system too.

Claudia Wessel-Hanssen

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 10 November 1989)

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In this country it seems that male and female film-makers are getting to be more active along with a few politicians, among them political figures in Schleswig-Holstein.

Björn Engholm, Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, speaks ever more often of an "Ars baltica," that is a coordinated campaign for the arts around the Baltic.

His Minister for the Arts, Eva Rühmkorf, following Hamburg's example (she comes from Hamburg), has become conscious of the fact that policies for the arts without a functioning programme to support the film, are no policies at all.

Frau Rühmkorf has promised in public in Lübeck to increase film subsidies in Schleswig-Holstein from the present DM300,000 to DM500,000 next year and to extend the Film Centre in Lübeck and to set up a film workshop, demanded by the public, in Kiel.

There is already an umbrella organisation for both and suitable accommodation. All that is needed now is that deeds should follow on the fine words.

Jürgen Schmidt-Missner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 8 November 1989)

Quality of life a crucial factor in helping cancer patients

The psycho-social consequences of cancer are crucial and far-reaching for both patients and their families.

Their outlook on life is changed for good. They face massive anxiety. Practical problems such as professional rehabilitation and reintegration need to be solved.

Against this background psycho-social care units for cancer patients were set up about a decade ago at a number of leading cancer clinics in Hamburg, Heidelberg, Cologne and Munich.

Psycho-oncology, or psycho-social oncology, was established as a scientific discipline at the same time.

It is a recently established discipline that deals with a wide range of issues that arise in connection with cancer ailments. Not even experts can clearly define them all.

They made an attempt to state where they stood at an inaugural psycho-social cancer congress in Heidelberg.

One approach discussed was aftercare at the Heidelberg and Mannheim tumour centre, which has handled nearly 10,000 patients in the past 10 years.

It consists of a doctor, psychologists, social workers, a sociologist and a nurse with special experience of cancer cases.

Each member of the team is attached to a specific ward at either the surgical clinic, the children's hospital or the polyclinic.

Work ranges from psycho-therapeutic care of cancer patients at all stages of their complaint via advice to doctors and nurses on how to handle cancer patients to practical tasks such as organising after-care.

On request members of the unit are sent to other clinics at the tumour centre to talk, say, with patients in a state of mental or emotional crisis on account of their complaint.

One patient in five is given outpatient treatment. Training courses are held to pass on practical experience to others doing cancer work in a professional capacity and to patients and self-help groups.

There were still too few self-help groups in the Federal Republic, Dr Reinhold Schwarz, head of the Heidelberg unit, told the congress.

He described the state of psycho-social care for cancer patients at hospitals as abysmal.

Despite initiatives launched by psycho-oncologists in the German Cancer Society, suggestions for improvements had yet to be taken up by the Federal Health Ministry.

Congress delegates complained that cancer was in many cases dealt with solely as a scientific medical problem — even though people knew better.

Psycho-oncologists have called for an academic chair to be set up in their discipline. Psycho-oncology was said still to be fragmented in teaching and research and to occur only allusively in certain sectors of medicine.

Research was needed into how the much-vaunted concept of "quality of life" was to be defined in connection with cancer and what psycho-social strain patients, their families and therapists were subjected to when (and after) cancer was diagnosed and/or treated.

Another research topic was how to assess the wide range of psychosomatic theories on how cancer originated, this being a subject that keenly interested the general public.

Psycho-oncologists are also keen to see medical students trained better to deal with cancer patients.

They feel students must be taught conversation techniques that demonstrate empathy with the patient when the time comes to tell patients and their families that cancer has been diagnosed.

Munich psychologist Dr Almut Sellschopp told the congress about a survey which had shown that cancer patients were better able to come to terms with their complaint when they had been comprehensively briefed by their doctor as soon as it had been diagnosed.

Ingeborg Bördlein

(Die Welt, Bonn, 8 November 1989)

ROAD SAFETY

Teaching drivers to be more careful is key to reducing death toll of children

In this article for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, Walther Wuttke looks at the evergreen problem of children and road traffic and argues that the entire approach to road safety must be changed.

German roads are the most dangerous in the industrialised world for children. Last year 42,706 children up to the age of 15 were involved in traffic accidents — an increase of 4.4 per cent over the previous year.

In 1987, 459 children were killed in traffic accidents. Belgium was next with 390, followed by Britain with 387 and Austria with 354.

The safest countries were those which are usually regarded as chaotic road conditions such as Italy (122), Yugoslavia (113) and Greece (102).

Small children are taught the rules of the road at school by experienced police officers and many parents believe this removes the danger. They are wrong. Because the who approach is wrong.

Instead, drivers should be trained to give more consideration to children. Children are spontaneous, they are are unpredictable. They are physically and mentally not in a position to comprehend complicated traffic systems.

They have a limited field of vision and they cannot estimate speed. This is why adults should be taught how children act on the road.

Certainly small children should be taught how to behave in traffic, but the aim should not be the impossible one of completely road-training them.

Children have far too much confidence in the reaction of adults to imagine that they would be harmed by the people they model themselves on.

Frequently road safety instructors hear motorists defending themselves with the remark: "But the child must have seen me."

At first glance, certainly, the situation was clear — for the motorist. But the child has a limited field of vision. The child could not see the oncoming car.

Frequently an adult's thoughtlessness is a factor in an accident involving a child. A long-running point for discussion in motoring magazines has been the question of speed on roads in front of school buildings — for years the result has been predictable. Accidents.

Motorists blow their horns when they see schoolchildren but they rarely slow down.

The attitude of our southern neighbours is quite the opposite. Italians, for whom the most important instrument in their car is perhaps the horn, make lots of noise, but they also have a foot on the brake.

Speed limits will not help much in controlling the speed madness on roads in front of schools and kindergartens. They would never be observed.

Road-surface obstacles such as artificial bumps, traffic islands and traffic lights increase road safety for children. Obviously straightening out a road from time to time only has the sad consequence of a difficult accident.

Worried parents have to learn from experience that city and town administrations can only be pushed to taking decisive action when a child is injured or killed on the way to school or kindergarten.

Often parental attitudes make it difficult for children to behave correctly in road traffic. Parents with their children thoughtlessly cross at traffic lights or zebra crossings when the pedestrian light shows red, or they go down one-way streets in the wrong direction on a bicycle, or they park on pavements so that pedestrians have to step into the roadway.

Then children are given their own bicycle at far too young an age. Small children are helpless as pedestrians. They do not know what to do all the time, and they are certainly not in a position to have proper control over a bicycle so that they can assess traffic situations correctly and react properly.

Going to and coming from school is the most dangerous part of a child's day, and the supposed greater safety of the school bus does not alter this much.

In other countries, the USA for example, especially built buses are used as school buses; in the rich Federal Republic the oldest buses transport children to and from school.

In these vehicles, built for adults, children can be hurt by the hand bars; when the vehicle brakes they can slide off the seats which are too high for them.

Frequently the buses are hopelessly over-crowded, because the local government wants to save money by not putting too many school buses into service.

Safety plays only a subsidiary role when it comes to putting school buses into service. Usually the contract is given to the company that has made the lowest bid to the local authorities.

It is logical then that the oldest vehicles available are put into service to transport the schoolchildren, with a driver who cannot be put behind the wheel on long routes or in scheduled services.

Police spot-checks regularly reveal that not enough attention is paid to safety measures and that the drivers are unsuitable for their task.

Several years ago the ADAC, the Federal Republic's motoring club, designed a school bus meeting children's requirements.

The entrance was lowered; the doors were made especially safe so that children could not be crushed if they closed on a child getting in or out of the bus. The seats were built at a height suitable for children and sharp edges were avoided as far as possible to reduce the danger of injury to the minimum.

There was little enthusiasm for the model among bus operators.

Traffic experts have been just as unsuccessful in pushing through another regulation which is applied in America, for example: when a bus stops the traffic around the bus must come to a halt as well. Heavy penalties are handed out to drivers who overtake a standing school bus.

In the Federal Republic, however, only safety-minded bus drivers halt their vehicle crossways on the road so that they stop the traffic and "their" children in the bus can cross the road in safety.

But children are not just endangered on the road: they run the risk of fatal injury in their parents' car.

Last year 12,997 children under the age of 15, travelling in a car, were injured in road accidents; 2,104 were severely injured and 105 killed. For the first time since May 1986 the number of children in cars killed in an accident rose.

The shocking aspect of these figures is that, according to traffic experts, the number of severely injured children could be reduced by 15 per cent if the parents had placed the children in an appropriate child's seat.

The motoring magazine *auto motor* looked at 870 accidents. It reported that the risks for children not using a safety belt was seven times greater that for children secured in the car.

The magazine reported that 82.7 per cent of children in seat belts or children's seats came through accidents without any injury.

Yet, despite these figures and the repeated appeals to parents to buckle their children into a seat in the car, most children travel in cars without any protection. Safety belts are only used for children when driving on motorways or on long holiday trips. A few years ago, when fines were imposed on adults who did not use safety belts, the use of safety belts rose by 90 per cent; but the federal office for traffic affairs noted in March that only 59 per cent of children were using safety belts; 29 per cent of these children were in special children's seats.

The security of children using a standard safety belt is, however, open to question. The safety belt system built into rear seats is designed for adults. They are only effective in protecting young people in an accident who are 1.20 metres tall. Only the special children's seat gives a child who is smaller safety.

In a head-on collision a child sitting in a rear seat is like a missile and is projected forwards. The child can suffer serious injury himself or herself as well as the parents in the front seats.

Where the danger is

Proportion of total traffic / Proportion of accidents involving death

Autobahns: 28 % / 9 %

Roads: 41 % / 61 %

City streets: 31 % / 30 %

G 7904 © Globus

Safety comes more cheaply than a car radio

Cost cannot be the reason why for a long time there have not been special children's seats in cars. Depending on the security system used the cost is between DM60 and DM200. This is not much for an extra, measured against the additional charge for a car radio, for instance.

When making a purchase parents should take care that the children's seat has an orange label with the number ECE 44 on it. This is the producer's guarantee that the seat comes up to internationally laid-down regulations.

The various systems are divided into four groups. Group Zero is offered for babies weighing up to nine kilograms. There are cradles for them which are fixed at three points at the passenger seat side of the car, facing the opposite direction to the direction of travel.

Group One protects infants between nine and 18 kilograms; Group Two is for pre-school children weighing between 15 and 25 kilograms. Group Three in the system covers seats for children between 22 and 36 kilograms in weight.

The easiest way of solving the problem would be if the car industry were more concerned about children and provided as standard folding seats for children, or at least offered children's seats as an extra in new models.

But only in cars of the future have appropriate safety measures been included — and it will be years before these models are rolling off the production lines.

Walther Wuttke

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 10 November 1989)

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idea," says someone with experience of what tends to happen.

Instruction relies on the services of a skilled interpreter. Trainees are selected in Moscow and usually come from Ministries and enterprises that have close ties with companies in Lower Saxony.

In Hungary the academy advertises in a professional journal. To qualify for courses lasting several months trainees must be graduates with several years' job experience and be able to follow German-language courses without difficulty.

Ministries and foundations in other German *Länder* are experimenting with similar schemes, but only Lower Saxony provides both theoretical and practical training.

Practical training is provided by local firms who hope contacts may lead to contracts.

When a Soviet management trainee sees for himself how goods are manufactured and gets to know the people who make them he will arguably prefer the product he knows.

That is why traineeships are provided by both large firms, such as Volkswagen or Preussag, and a wide range of smaller companies, such as Cameron Iron Works GmbH, Celle.

Cameron manufacture high-pressure equipment. Their annual turnover is DM200m.

At a later stage the academy plans to prepare Germans for a tour of duty in the Soviet Union or another Warsaw Pact state.

Plans aren't limited to training. Once makeshift arrangements have been superseded and the academy is installed in its new quarters regular exchanges of opinion between East and West are envisaged.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 November 1989)